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ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE: An exploratory analysis demonstrating that U.S. radiation
policymaking should be remade in a manner that considers the risk tradeoffs associated
with dose-limiting regulations.
METHODS: Three studies contribute separate chapters to this manuscript. The
first study is a systematic review conforming to PRISMA guidelines. PubMed and the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s web-based public recordkeeping database were
searched for evidence demonstrating a concern for risk tradeoff. The second study
conceptualizes a theory based model for predicting risk tradeoff in radiation
policymaking. The model integrates sources of risk tradeoff and constructs of moral
disengagement theory. The third study reviews radiological data obtained during 11
cyclotron decommissioning projects. The data are translated into meaningful metrics that
are valuable for examining risk tradeoffs made by low-level radioactive waste
policymaking.
RESULTS: A total of 64 relevant documents were returned by the literature
review, but only eight documents were concerned with radiation risks. Only one of the
documents reflects an analysis of risk tradeoff, whereas six express a need for forwardthinking policymaking that considers countervailing risks. The result of the second study
is an illustrative conceptual model. The model predicts that well-intentioned
policymakers, faced with jurisdictional boundaries and other pervasive sources of risk
tradeoff, may offer policy solutions that reduce target risks but ignore countervailing
risks. Policymaking accomplished in this manner will fail to offer maximum risk
protection. Calculated dose equivalents for the 11 sites examined by the third study
v

ranged from 0.01 to 43.2 mSv y-1 and correspond to a risk of 0.1 to 432 extra cases of
solid cancer or leukemia per 100,000 persons. Waste from nine of the sites exceeds the
dose limit specified in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s radiological criteria
for unrestricted use. Notwithstanding such findings, cyclotron waste is not regulated as
low-level radioactive waste.
CONCLUSIONS: The paradigm for radiation protection policymaking should be
remade in a manner that looks beyond the perceived immediate benefits of limiting dose.
For a new paradigm to prevail, research that examines risk tradeoffs with a logical
framework is needed, and the public must be educated on the unembellished actual risks
associated with radiation.
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INTRODUCTION
Background
The term “radiation” is used to describe energy that propagates through space or
matter in the form of electromagnetic waves or fast moving particles (Hall and Giaccia
2012). Radiation is characterized as being either ionizing or nonionizing. Ionizing
radiation is the subset of all radiation that is energetic enough to create ion pairs by
dislodging electrons from an atom and includes x-rays, gamma-rays, neutrons, and
charged atomic particles (NAS 2006, Hall and Giaccia 2012). Nonionizing radiation does
not have sufficient energy to create ion pairs and includes ultraviolet, visible, and infrared
light; microwaves; and radio waves. The radiation paradigm and public health policies
this research examine pertain to ionizing radiation, but the term “radiation” will be used
throughout. This is consistent with common usage of the term and much of the literature
reviewed, including a 2006 report by the National Academy of Sciences that is important
to a discussion of the current paradigm. That report defines radiation as “energy emitted
in the form of waves or particles by radioactive atoms as a result of radioactive decay or
produced by artificial means, such as x-ray generators” (NAS 2006). This definition
conspicuously excludes nonionizing radiations.
The world was formally introduced to radiation in 1895 when a German physicist
named Wilhelm Roentgen discovered x-rays and their unique ability to pass through the
human body and produce radiographic images (Walker 2000). In the first few decades
following Roentgen’s discovery, incredible advances were made in the field of medicine
and by scientists seeking to harness atomic properties for energy and defense (Walker
2000). Unfortunately, such advances were made in the absence of any policies protecting
1

the health of researchers or their subjects. Early work often assumed that radiation was
innocuous, and it was handled with few controls and to the detriment of experimenters’
health (Walker 2000, Jones 2005, Colvett 2006). For instance, the x-ray proved to be an
effective instrument for probing tissues and materials; however, researchers frequently
conducted experiments on themselves and others and in a manner leading to severe
overexposures (Walker 2000). Erythema (skin reddening) and burns associated with early
research were often dismissed as temporary effects, and it was not until years later that
we would learn of radiation’s long term consequences.
Within a few decades of its discovery, radiation was known to cause sterility,
bone disease, cancer, and other harm (Walker 2000). Notwithstanding the evidence of
harmful effects that was accumulating, radiation continued to be used and researched
absent of any formal policies or policymaking. Radiation remained a somewhat distal and
mysterious phenomenon to much of the public until its harmful effects were
demonstrated in spectacular fashion when the U.S. dropped two atomic bombs on Japan
in August of 1945 (Holmes 2005, Jordan 2016). Imagery returned from the aftermath in
the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki suddenly informed the world of insidious harms
that could not be forgotten. This would forever change our normative beliefs, and from
that point forward it has been impossible to consider any level of radiation aside from its
effects.
Features of the Existing Framework for Radiation Policy
Over time, people became as curious about radiation’s harmful effects as its other
mysterious qualities. As researchers’ interests evolved, their findings informed a new
field - radiation protection, or what is called health-physics by U.S. practitioners.
2

Radiation protection policymaking can be traced back to the Second International
Congress on Radiology in 1928, where an International X-Ray and Radium Protection
Committee was formed from a group of scientists and physicians (Walker 2000, Jones
2005). Its U.S. counterpart, the Advisory Committee on X-Ray and Radium Protection,
was formed the following year (Walker 2000, Jones 2005). Both organizations involved
themselves in advocacy measures intended to increase awareness and improve handling
practices; however, neither group was endowed with statutory authority (Walker 2000).
The framework for U.S. policymaking has evolved considerably over the years.
Today, the responsibility for the nation’s radiation policymaking is shared by multiple
federal agencies: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Defense (DoD),
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Department of Labor (DOL),
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (EPA 2000). The jurisdictional
boundaries of these agencies are not necessarily reflected by mutually exclusive
responsibilities, which complicates the rules they publish in the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR). For example, NRC and EPA have overlapping responsibility related
to waste from cleanup of radioactive sites. Other significant intersections exist, such as
occupational health and safety, transportation, waste disposal, and responsibilities
transferred to states. The result is a complex patchwork of regulations that do not seek
unified radiation protection and health outcomes.
The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 transferred certain congressionally
mandated responsibilities to the NRC, including an obligation to protect people and the
environment from unnecessary exposure to radiation as a result of civilian uses of nuclear
3

materials: nuclear power plants, research reactors, and other medical, industrial, and
academic uses (NRC 2015). Moreover, states wishing to regulate certain materials within
their borders enter into agreements with the NRC, and in doing so, adopt regulations that
do not vary considerably from NRC. Thus, the NRC’s role in radiation policymaking is
unique in terms of scope and reach.
A key feature of the regulatory framework used by the NRC is that it authorizes
civilian uses of nuclear materials through a process called licensing. The licensed
organizations, or “licensees”, then operate nuclear facilities or use or transport nuclear
materials according to the NRC’s rules. The rules are published in Title 10 of the CFR
(i.e., 10 CFR). The complete set of rules contains 199 parts; however, most of parts apply
to rules within the NRC’s jurisdiction but not specifically concerned with controlling
radiation.
The NRC’s Standards for Protection Against Radiation are specified in 10 CFR §
20 and consist of rules pertaining to general provisions, radiation protection programs,
occupational dose limits, radiation dose limits for individual members of the public,
radiological criteria for license termination, surveys and monitoring, control of exposure
from external sources in restricted areas, respiratory protection and controls to restrict
internal exposure in restricted areas, storage and control of licensed material,
precautionary procedures, waste disposal, records, reports, exemptions, additional
requirements, and enforcement.
The Radiation Paradigm and Risk Tradeoff
The word “paradigm” is used to describe the prevailing group of ideas and
theories about how something should be done, made, thought about, or researched (Kuhn
4

1962). In this regard, and due in part to public concerns and Hollywood embellishments
that can be traced back to the 1940s, the radiation protection paradigm is that any amount
of radiation is harmful and should be avoided. Policymaking accomplished by the NRC
and other actors according to this paradigm results in rigid dose-limiting regulations and,
because any dose is presumed harmful, a subsequent requirement is to make every
reasonable effort to maintain exposures as far below the dose limits as is practical (NRC
2018a, NRC 2018b). Thus, radiation policymaking is singularly focused on improving
health outcomes by lowering radiation dose.
As well-intended as policymaking accomplished according to the radiation
paradigm may seem, efforts to reduce one health risk often increases other unmeasured
risks. The risks unintentionally or unknowingly fostered are called countervailing risks,
and choosing to manage one risk in light of countervailing risks is called a risk tradeoff
(Graham and Wiener 1995). Trading one risk for another is a phenomenon encountered in
everyday decision-making, and countervailing risks are described by familiar terms such
as side effects, collateral damage, and unintentional consequences (Graham and Wiener
1995).
Objectives
The three studies contributing as chapters to this manuscript are related in that
they are concerned that U.S. radiation policymaking is not conducted according to a
framework that adequately considers risk tradeoff. It is intended that the articles
comprising this manuscript will be published in a manner contributing to the literature
that federal agencies will look to as they consider the appropriateness of their policies and
regulations. Three articles examining three different questions are presented.
5

Question 1: Is Risk Tradeoff Analysis (RTA) a suitable means of exploring U.S.
radiation policymaking decisions? The proposed question is examined with systematic
review accomplished according to Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and
Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines. The study provides a scoping review of the
pervasiveness of risk tradeoff concerns in research indexed by PubMed or documents
made public by NRC.
Question 2: How is radiation policymaking leading to risk tradeoffs
conceptualized with a psychosocial theory-based model? This question is examined by
integrating concepts from Moral Disengagement Theory and RTA into an illustrative
model that can be used to examine radiation policymaking that is accomplished according
to a linear-no-threshold (LNT) model of radiation dose response.
Question 3: Do wastes from cyclotron decommissioning projects pose health
disparities that U.S. nuclear waste policies currently ignore? This question is examined
with an analysis of data collected during cyclotron decommissioning projects completed
by Ameriphysics, LLC. The data reflect radionuclide-specific activity concentrations in
concrete. Activity concentrations are transformed to peak dose to a critical group
according to federal guidance, wherein the critical group is defined as “the group of
individuals reasonably expected to receive the greatest exposure to residual radioactivity
for any applicable set of circumstances” (NRC 2006, NRC 2018a). The transformed
doses are compared against decommissioning cleanup criterion in 10 CFR 20 and
translated into population risk estimates using predictions from the National Research
Council of the National Academy of Sciences.

6

CHAPTER I
RISK TRADEOFF AND RADIATION PROTECTION: A SCOPING REVIEW
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A version of this chapter is being prepared for submission to Environmental
Health Perspectives for consideration.
The student developed the search strategy, selection criteria, and data extraction
criteria and drafted the manuscript. The student’s Committee reviewed and approved the
strategies and criteria developed by the student and read, provided feedback, and
approved the final manuscript.
Abstract
OBJECTIVE: To accomplish a systematic review of documents indexed by
PubMed and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission public records database to explore the
use and suitability of Risk Tradeoff Analysis as a means of informing U.S. radiation
policymaking.
METHODS: The aforementioned databases were searched using the inclusionary
terms “risk trade”, “risk tradeoff”, and “risk tradeoffs” and exclusionary terms related to
patient choices and preferences and animal predation. Unique documents that were
printed in English and concerned with matters of public health were coded according to
target risk, constructs of comparative risk assessment, and relevance. Relevance was
rated high when constructs of risk tradeoff were discussed in conjunction with radiation
risks and low when such constructs were presented in association with other risks.
Results are tabulated and followed by a mostly narrative synthesis of findings.
RESULTS: A total of 64 relevant documents were returned by the search, 60 from
PubMed and four from Web-based ADAMS. Only eight documents were determined to
be highly relevant (i.e., concerned with radiation risks), four from PubMed and four from
Web-based ADAMS. Only one of the highly relevant documents reflects an analysis of
8

risk tradeoff, whereas the majority (75%) express a need for forward-thinking
policymaking that considers countervailing risks.
CONCLUSIONS: The paradigm for radiation protection policymaking should be
remade in a manner that looks beyond the perceived immediate benefits of dose-limiting
regulations, and Risk Tradeoff Analysis provides a logical framework that has benefited
other public-health related decision making.
Introduction
Radiation exposure is a dreaded environmental hazard, with evidence of public
fears tracing back to atomic bombings that occurred in Japan in 1945 and the media
reports and Hollywood embellishments that followed (Walker 2000, Jones 2005). The
reality of the evidence contemplating radiation’s effects on humans, however, is that the
risks attributable to low, and in particular, very low, levels of ionizing radiation on
humans are unknown (GAO 2000, Tubiana et al. 2009). Epidemiological studies do not
have the statistical power needed to describe the dose–response relationship at low doses
(Suzuki and Yamashita 2012). Moreover, the actual risk remains unknown in the
presence of data from hundreds of thousands of diverse human subjects that have been
collected over the better part of a century. That is, the fact that the exact risk remains
unknown is not because scientists lack data, but because the preponderance of data
suggest that the risk is so small at low doses that it cannot be discriminated.
Due in part to the public’s perception of the seriousness of exposure to
environmental radiation, policymaking is accomplished according to the paradigm that
any amount of radiation is harmful and should be avoided (Cohen 2002, Calabrese 2013,
Doss 2013). Because the U.S. framework for policymaking is highly fragmented,
9

multiple federal agencies demonstrate some responsibility for protecting the public from
radiation (Levi 1946, U.S. Congress 1946, GAO 2000, GPO 2001). The result is a
patchwork of detailed and rigid radiation protection policies that are largely unrelated to
each other and do not seek unified health outcomes except to reduce dose to as low a
level as reasonably achievable.
An implicit concern of regulatory action is that well-intentioned efforts to reduce
one risk may cause other adverse health outcomes (Viscusi 1994, Graham and Wiener
1995). These adverse outcomes are “costs” of the regulatory action. These costs are not
exclusively financial; rather, they encompass any type of countervailing risk that arises
(Hofstetter et al. 2002). Whenever the portfolio of risk is changed by an action that
knowingly or inadvertently generates a countervailing risk (i.e., cost as previous
described), a risk tradeoff is said to have occurred (Graham and Wiener 1995).
Thus, policies aimed at reducing dose because any amount of radiation is presumed
harmful may unknowingly lead to important risk tradeoffs, especially if the risks due to
radiation are lower than predicted or nonexistent as suggested by contemporary critics
(Tubiana et al. 2009, Suzuki and Yamashita 2012, Doss 2013). Until the benefits sought
by dose-limiting regulations are compared against countervailing risks with a suitable
comparative analysis method, we cannot be sure if such policymaking results in optimal
health outcomes.
The pool of possible comparative analysis methods is large. Hofstetter et al.
examines a variety of popular tools and introduces a subset of methods that provide a
means of analyzing risk tradeoffs including life cycle assessment, programmatic
comparative risk assessment, benefit-cost analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, health10

health analysis, comparative risk analysis of alternatives, and risk tradeoff analysis
(RTA)(2002). RTA differs from many of the other methods in that it is explicitly
proposed as a means of analyzing the effectiveness of decisions designed to reduce risk,
and not just the financial costs borne by taxpayers, regulated industries, and consumers to
reduce risk (Graham and Wiener 1995). This unique feature of RTA allows decision
makers to determine if, at a given financial cost, a policy action optimally minimizes risk
(Graham and Wiener 1995). As a mechanism for eliminating policy options that are
clearly not to society’s benefit, one source claimed that a risk-versus-risk analysis is
superior to approaches that rely on cost-effectiveness, particularly in those contexts
where there is reluctance to make tradeoffs between monetary costs and health (Viscusi
1994).
Agencies populating the U.S. Executive Branch have been required to weigh the
costs and benefits of any regulatory action since February 1981 when President Reagan
issued Executive Order 12291 (Presidential Documents 1981, NRC 2017d). That Order
was replaced (i.e., revoked) by Executive Order 12866 in September 1993 by President
Clinton, but the new Order maintained a requirement to assess all costs and benefits of
available regulatory alternatives (Presidential Documents 1993, NRC 2017d). Moreover,
the Order compelled federal agencies to “select those approaches that maximize net
benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other
advantages; distributive impacts, and equity)” (Presidential Documents 1993). Executive
Order 12866 was reaffirmed in January 2011 by President Obama and remains relative
today (Presidential Documents 2011).
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Due in part to instructions from the Executive Branch, a number of U.S. laws
require some form of comparative risk assessment. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment
requires the Environmental Protection Agency to assess its efforts to reduce risks and
report any adverse health or environmental impacts of such actions, including unintended
consequences (Rascoff and Revesz 2002). The 1996 amendment to the Safe Drinking
Water Act reflects a similar requirement (Rascoff and Revesz 2002). The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), which administers the federal budget and assesses the
performance of federal agencies, has used RTA in its analysis of federal agency
policymaking. In one instance, OMB even suspended its review of OSHA rulemaking
until that agency considered the risk tradeoffs of regulations that would establish
permissible exposure levels for more than 600 workplace air contaminants (Rascoff and
Revesz 2002).
Despite the availability of comparative risk measures, Executive Orders informing
regulatory reviews for nearly four decades, and consideration of risk tradeoff by other
agencies, the comprehensive analysis of countervailing risk is not a chief concern of the
U.S. federal agency tasked with mitigating radiation-induced detriment in humans, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NRC maintains that as an independent agency,
it is not statutorily required to conduct regulatory analysis (NRC 2017d). Instead, NRC
“voluntarily complies” with Executive Order 12866 through a set of regulatory analysis
guidelines that demonstrate the agency’s “desire to meet the spirit of Executive Orders
related to cost-benefit reform and decision-making” (NRC 2017d).
The methodology NRC uses for estimating and evaluating the risks and benefits
of any decisions conducted under its jurisdiction are described in its regulatory analysis
12

guidelines, but the attributes examined are changes in radiation exposures which are then
converted to dollars and summed to obtain the net monetary value (NRC 2017d). The
guidelines were originally published in 1983 and are updated from time to time, with the
fifth revision being offered as a “draft for comment” in 2017. The draft guidelines remain
committed to benefit-cost analysis in dose-converted monetary terms rather than to a
strategy for weighing radiation versus other risk(s). A main focus of the guidelines
continues to be an emphasis on Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), an analysis tool
that examines the monetized population dose that is averted and other economic costs of
a decision (NRC 2017d). As evidence of the pervasiveness of PRA in the guidelines, the
term is used 44 times in NRC’s explanation of its regulatory analysis.
RTA differs considerably from the methodology presented in the NRC’s
guidelines as it consists of identifying risk tradeoffs, weighing the comparative
importance of target and countervailing risks, and exploring opportunities to reduce
overall risk (Graham and Wiener 1995). Thus, RTA is pragmatic in that it seeks to reduce
overall risk rather than trading one kind of risk for another (Graham and Wiener 1995).
This study proposes that constructs of RTA are used in a variety of contexts impacting
public health outcomes and should be considered similarly suitable for examinations of
radiation protections, particularly if NRC intends to meet the spirit of Executive Orders
pertaining to regulatory analysis as it claims.
The objective of this study is to systematically review the literature for qualitative
evidence that explores the use and suitability of the RTA framework as a means of
informing U.S. radiation policymaking. A scoping review conforming to PRISMA
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(Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis) guidelines is
intended. To this end, the proposed review will answer the following questions:
1.

How frequently is risk tradeoff a primary concern in radiation-related research
indexed in PubMed compared to other public health disciplines (i.e.,
environmental, economic, healthcare, food safety)?

2.

How frequently is risk tradeoff a topic of concern in records the U.S. NRC makes
available to the public via its web-based database?

3.

For documents identified via the searches accomplished to answer questions 1 and
2, how are concepts of risk tradeoff described in association with radiation risk?
Note that although these questions are involved exclusively with concerns of risk

tradeoff, this study is not intended to discredit other comparative analysis tools, or even
PRA for that matter. Environmental decision-making is generally associated with 10
categorically different types of risk, and no framework ideally covers all risk types
(Hofstetter et al. 2002). Moreover, different levels of decision making (i.e., from micro to
macro) and dimensions of analysis (i.e., society, environment, and economy) are needed,
and some tools perform well for one level or dimension but not the others (Hofstetter et
al. 2002). Thus, the goal of this literature review is not to demonstrate that RTA is better
than, or a replacement for, other methods of risk analysis as that argument would be
moot. Instead, this study hypothesizes that RTA should be part of a holistic approach to
maximally optimize net risk reductions.
Methods
Two databases, PubMed and Web-based ADAMS (WBA) were searched
according to the process depicted in Figure 1 and explained herein. PubMed is an index
14

Figure 1. Data Evaluation Process
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of more than 28 million citations for biomedical literature from MEDLINE, life science
journals, and online books (NCBI 2018). WBA is an interface to the NRC official records
repository, the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
(NRC 2017a). More than 730,000 regulatory guides and reports, inspection reports, NRC
documents, correspondence, and other regulatory and technical documents and 2 million
bibliographic citations are searchable via WBA (NRC 2017a).
Because it is important to the current study to identify literature wherein risk
tradeoff is a major element, a search using variations of the term “risk tradeoff” was
conducted with each database. The search terms “risk trade”, “risk trade-”, “risk
tradeoff”, and “risk tradeoffs” were used and returned 125 documents in PubMed and 245
documents in WBA. The exclusionary terms “discrete choice experiment”, “patient
preference”, “predator”, “predators”, and “predation” were used to narrow the results to
85 and 236 documents, respectively. The searches were conducted on December 7, 2018.
Titles and abstracts of the remaining documents were scrutinized by the principal
investigator to determine applicability to the current study. For documents other than
journal articles, the respective executive summaries, introductions, and conclusions were
reviewed to garner a sense of content. Documents were rejected if they were (1) printed
in a language other than English; (2) substantially duplicated in another document, e.g.,
drafts and reprints; (3) concerned with matters other than public health, e.g., technical
criteria for reactor mechanical equipment; or (4) related to the previously described
exclusionary terms.
Surviving documents were examined and coded by the principal investigator
according to three criteria: (1) target risk, (2) constructs of comparative risk assessment,
16

and (3) relevance to this review. Risks were categorized as (1) radiation, (2)
environmental, (3) economic, (4) healthcare, (5) food safety, (6) other, or a combination
thereof; constructs were categorized as (1) risk tradeoff, (2) benefit-cost, (3) life cycle
impact (4) programmatic risk assessment, or a combination thereof. Relevance is rated
(1) high when subject or implied risks included radiation and discussions within the
document inferred constructs of risk tradeoff and (2) low when constructs of risk tradeoff
are discussed in conjunction with risks other than radiation. These data and the document
title, author, and year of publication were transcribed into conventional software (i.e.,
Microsoft Excel) by the principal investigator. Where the relevance of the source is coded
as high, excerpts and major features indicating the manner in which constructs of risk
tradeoff were used were also recorded.
Except for counting the number of documents related to each of the risk
categories (i.e., radiation, environmental, economic, healthcare, and food safety) to
compare radiation risk against other categories, the data are not suitable for quantitative
analyses. Instead, a mostly narrative synthesis is used to explore the manner in which risk
tradeoffs are described in source documents. Excerpts from documents coded as highly
relevant are tabulated along with title, author(s), and year of the document and the name
of the database returning the document (i.e., PubMed or WBA). Excerpts are arranged
from newest to oldest so that the manner in which references to risk tradeoff have
changed over time is observable. Excerpts are followed by a table indicating major
features of relevant documents and a narrative synthesis of findings. The narrative is brief
because the number of sources is small.
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Results
The data collected by the search and relevant to this review (i.e., coded “high” or
“low”) are used to populate Table 1 and provide an indication of the use of risk tradeoff
in documents available via the two databases. Note that as some documents were
concerned with multiple disciplines, it is possible that the document is counted more than
once. For this reason, n is the total number of documents recovered from each database
rather than the summation of disciplines counted.
As the table demonstrates, risk tradeoff is a pervasive feature of public health
literature. The benefits of medicines, treatments, and diagnostic methods are carefully
compared against risks (Cross et al. 2011, Marchant and Lindor 2012, Brass et al. 2013,
Evans et al. 2016, Kim et al. 2017, Guk et al. 2018, Reader et al. 2018). Water and air
quality controls are discussed in terms of risks and benefits (Rabinovici et al. 2004,
Nevers et al. 2013, Gingerich and Mauter 2017). Risk tradeoffs associated with
pesticides, mercury, octane, flame-retardants, mycotoxin, and other chemical and
environmental exposures are investigated (Gray and Hammitt 2000, Murphy et al. 2000,
Stikkers 2002, Charnley 2003, Wu 2004, van Klaveren and Boon 2009, Shimshack and
Ward 2010). Hazardous waste cleanup and transportation, the built environment,
recreational promotions, ecosystem management, fish consumption, disinfectants - even
helmet laws and the shelf lives of certain foods – are all examined in terms of risk
tradeoffs (Hammitt et al. 1999, Breslin et al. 2007, Glickman et al. 2007, de Nazelle et al.
2009, Newbold 2012, Rheinberger and Hammitt 2012, Yang et al. 2012, Crookes et al.
2013, Stern et al. 2014, Guillou et al. 2016).
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Table 1. Risk Tradeoff in Primary Sources
Public Health Disciplines Represented
Database
n
Radiation Environmental Economic Healthcare
PubMed
WBA

60
4

4
4

38
1

19

1
1

18
0

Food
Safety
2
0

Where the relevance of the primary source is coded as high indicating a
relationship to radiation risk, Table 2 provides excerpts demonstrating the implicit
manner in which constructs of risk tradeoff analysis are applied, intended, or
recommended. The tabulated sources are arranged from newest to oldest.
Finally, Table 3 demonstrates the manner in which concepts of risk tradeoff were
used in the eight documents that were found to be highly relevant.
Discussion
Despite considerations of risk tradeoff across an array of topics important to
public health, analysis of such tradeoffs is not a pervasive feature of radiation literature as
this scoping review located only eight documents that anticipated risk tradeoffs when
investigations contemplate radiation risks. Only one document, the 2015 article by
Murakami et al., reflects a methodological analysis of risk tradeoff. Overwhelmingly, the
majority of documents (75%) generally express a need for forward-looking policymaking
that looks beyond the perceived immediate benefits of dose-limiting regulations in a
manner that considers countervailing risks (NRC 1985, OMB 2003, Burger et al. 2004,
Damon 2006, NRC 2008, Agapova et al. 2017).
Since as early as 1985, NRC has understood that prescriptive policymaking
interferes with the commission’s ability to make risk-superior decisions (NRC 1985).
Similarly, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) was warned in 2004 through research it
funds that the agency had already spent more than $60 billion on cleanup without
realizing a reduction in actual health risk because of the number of ecological, temporal,
and human health tradeoffs involved (Burger et al. 2004). Notwithstanding such findings,
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Table 2. Key Excerpts from Relevant Primary Sources
Year
2018

Database
PubMed

Authors
Murakami M.,
Kumagai A.,
Ohtsuru A.

Title/Topic
Building Risk
Communication
Capabilities
among
Professionals:
Seven Essential
Characteristics
of Risk
Communication

2017

PubMed

Agapova M.,
Bresnahan B.W.,
Linnau K.F.,
Garrison L.P. Jr,
Higashi M.,
Kessler L.,
Devine B.

Toward a
Framework for
Benefit-Risk
Assessment in
Diagnostic
Imaging:
Identifying
ScenarioSpecific Criteria

2015

PubMed

Murakami M.,
Ono K.,
Tsubokura M.,
Nomura S.,
Oikawa T.,
Oka T.,
Kami M.,
Oki T.

Was the Risk
from NursingHome
Evacuation after
the Fukushima
Accident Higher
than the
Radiation Risk?

2008

WBA

U.S. NRC

Enclosure 1 Risk-Informed
Decisionmaking
for Nuclear
Material and
Waste
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Excerpts Relative to Risk Tradeoff
1. "[R]isk communication professionals
should point out possible risk tradeoff problems to support people’s
decision-making, if they are not
aware of them."
2. "To communicate information on
risks to people, professionals and
authorities need to understand that
there is another quality of risk, rather
than assuming risk could be
adequately assessed with statistical
data."
3. "Using a narrative of risk trade-offs...,
we introduce the seven essential
characteristics required by medical
professionals and authorities involved
in risk communication."
1. "Diagnostic imaging has many effects
and there is no common definition of
value in diagnostic radiology. As
benefit-risk trade-offs are rarely made
explicit, it is not clear which
framework is used in clinical
guideline development. We describe
initial steps toward the creation of a
benefit-risk framework for diagnostic
radiology."
1. "The most important points are that
we need to take evacuation-related
risk into account together with
radiation exposure risk, and that we
need to improve our social system in
order to mitigate evacuation-related
risks."
2. "[C]ompulsory evacuation needs to
be well balanced with the trade-off
against radiation risk and in
consideration of the concept of
acceptable risk. Comprehensive
strategies that fully consider both
radiation risks and evacuation-related
risks will minimize the overall risk to
society."
1. Figure 4.1 of the source document
conveys a flowchart entitled "Risk
Assessment Process". One of the
steps is "Assess changes in risk", and
in input to that assessment is
"competing risks".

Table 2. Continued
Year

Database

2006

WBA

2004

PubMed

Authors

Title/Topic
Applications
Revision 1.

2.

Damon D.R.

A Risk-BenefitControl
Paradigm for
DecisionMaking

1.

Burger J.,
Powers C.,
Greenberg M.,
Gochfeld M.

The Role of
Risk and Future
Land Use in
Cleanup
Decisions at the
Department of
Energy

1.

2.
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Excerpts Relative to Risk Tradeoff
"Understanding the risks and their
trade-offs can only enhance the
perspective. It is also important to
communicate the benefits as well as
the risks of a given situation or
decision."
"Legitimate activities in society are
conducted to produce benefits for the
organizations conducting them.
However, even a legitimate and
beneficial activity may have adverse
impacts (risks) as well. In fact, there
may be multiple types of both
positive and adverse impacts, which
differ among different individuals or
groups. While it is clear that it is
desirable to increase benefits and
reduce risks, the fact is that a given
action may produce both effects, and
may affect different persons
differently. Hence, it is desirable to
have precision decision-rules and
principles in order to choose among
alternative actions."
"[L]inking cleanup decisions and
goals with the final end state involves
a number of risk tradeoffs, including
(1) ecological versus human health,
(2) worker versus public health, (3)
among competing contaminated
areas, (4) among temporal patterns of
cleanup, (5) among different
ecological receptors (plants vs.
animals, one animal vs. another), and
(6) among the sites across the DOE
complex. For the nation, balancing
among risks is essential within sites
and among Department of Energy
sites, as well as among other
remediation sites (such as those of
Department of Defense and
Superfund sites)."
"Looking at the current compliance‐
driven program, the DOE top‐to‐
bottom review team asserted that
'since the program's inception in
1989, more than $60 billion has been
spent without a corresponding
reduction in actual risk.'"

Table 2. Continued
Year

Database

Authors

Title/Topic
3.

4.

2003

WBA

Office of
Management and
Budget

NRC Pre-Filed
Hearing Exhibit
NRC000060,
Office of
Management
and Budget
Circular A-4,
"Regulatory
Analysis"

1.

1985

WBA

U.S. NRC

NUREG-1070
"NRC Policy on
Future Reactor
Designs Decisions on
Severe Accident
Issues in
Nuclear Power
Plant
Regulation"

1.

2.
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Excerpts Relative to Risk Tradeoff
"There is general agreement that
cleanup and remediation of
contaminated sites is an important
and urgent task. However, there is
less consensus concerning the
strategy for such cleanup with respect
to the role of risk to humans and the
environment, and the impact of future
land use(s) on cleanup decisions and
goals."
"[R]isk balancing is required within
and among sites for a complex such
as the DOE."
“[Policy] analysis should look beyond
the direct benefits and direct costs of
your rulemaking and consider any
important ancillary benefits and
countervailing risks. An ancillary
benefit is a favorable impact of the
rule that is typically unrelated or
secondary to the statutory purpose of
the rulemaking (e.g., reduced refinery
emissions due to more stringent fuel
economy standards for light trucks)
while a countervailing risk is an
adverse economic, health, safety, or
environmental consequence that
occurs due to a rule and is not already
accounted for in the direct cost of the
rule (e.g., adverse safety impacts
from more stringent fuel-economy
standards for light trucks)."
"Forward-looking policy needs to be
developed in a manner that would
encourage innovative ways of
achieving superior safety levels at
reasonable costs. A highly
prescriptive set of technical
performance criteria for functions
important to severe accident safety
would have the effect of preventing
the sort of risk-risk tradeoff decisions
in plant design that might achieve
such optimal results."
"The [NRC] staff, in making severe
accident decisions, will draw from the
research performed under the aegis of
the safety goal evaluation program to
explore safety-cost tradeoffs within
the framework of permissible riskrisk tradeoffs."

Table 3. Major Features of Relevant Documents
Feature
Presents a quantitative analysis of risk tradeoff

n
1

Document(s)
Murakami et al. 2015

Conveys a need to improve skills and
approaches for communicating risk tradeoffs

1

Murakami et al. 2018

Conveys a need to employ a decision
framework for managing risk tradeoffs

6

Agapova et al. 2017,
NRC 2008, Damon 2006,
Burger et al. 2004,
OMB 2003, NRC 1985
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no evidence was found indicating that either agency had adapted its rulemaking in a
manner to weigh target risk reductions against increases in countervailing risk(s).
Two of the eight “highly relevant” articles returned by the PubMed search reflect
lessons learned from the 2011 disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
These and other articles examining health outcomes related to evacuation of the
Fukushima prefecture make the strongest contemporary case for analyzing risk tradeoffs
in radiation policymaking. Impacted areas were evacuated as a means of avoiding
radiation exposures of 20 – 100 millisieverts (mSv), an amount commensurate with
common medical diagnostic procedures, and such evacuations are known to have resulted
in increased mortalities (Murakami et al. 2015). In one study of nursing home residents,
the total loss of life expectancy (LLE) due to evacuation-related risks was 11,000
persons-days whereas the total predicted LLE due to the radiation levels involved was
several orders of magnitudes less, between 0.11 and 27 persons-days (Murakami et al.
2015). In other research related to Fukushima Daiichi, more than 1,900 deaths were
attributed to the physical and mental stresses related to evacuee living by 2015, and five
years after the accident, more than 100,000 people were still forced to live in temporary
accommodations (Hayakawa 2016). One source states that “[D]isaster-related deaths are
undeniably an element of man-made disaster, as these individuals were saved by
emergency evacuation and subsequently lost their lives due to insufficient measures to
support them (Hayakawa 2016). Furthermore, “Fear of invisible radioactive
contamination inactivated [traditional] outdoor activities such as farming, dairy, fishing,
gardening, hiking and wild-vegetable/mushroom hunting” and “brought serious social
pains although [the radiation] did not acutely hurt our bodies” (Ishikawa 2013). Although
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the literature is rich with evidence from Fukushima Daiichi substantiating the need to
consider the risk tradeoffs associated with managing radiation risks (Murakami et al.
2015, Hayakawa 2016, Murakami et al. 2018), U.S. policymaking remains concerned
with keeping radiation exposures as low as possible rather than with utilization of a
comparative risk measure such as RTA to reduce overall risk.
Limitations
This review only searches two databases whereas searches via numerous other
databases are possible. As a scoping review was intended, this limitation is by design,
and PubMed was specifically used because of its popularity among public health
researchers and professionals. The other database, WBA, is not a collection of peerreviewed literature. Rather, it serves as a searchable source of official NRC records
including guides, reports, technical documents, correspondence, and other regulatory
information written by NRC staff, contractors, licensees, and other agencies or submitted
by members of the public (NRC 2017a). In the case of the paper by Dennis Damon, for
example, the document reflects the author’s submission to the 8th International
Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management (2006). The paper
contains a common disclaimer indicating that it was prepared by an employee of the NRC
but does not represent an agreed staff position. Thus, the WBA database represents a
powerful tool for searching NRC’s official records but not necessarily for discerning
scientific consensus. Nonetheless, the documents available via WBA are valuable to the
current study because they demonstrate the depth and manner in which risk tradeoffs are
considered by the records NRC believes are important enough to share with the public.
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By necessity, the search and exclusionary criteria include somewhat generic terms
that complicated the review and data reduction. For example, the word “risk” enjoys
bountiful use throughout health and policy literature, and just searching this term returns
millions of documents. The identification of exclusionary terms was similarly
problematic, as few exclusions were possible without rejecting the limited number of
papers pertinent to the current study. Searches relying on and complicated by
commonplace terms returned a large number documents, making judgement calls on
relevance challenging. This is particularly true in the case of documents retrieved via
WBA where less than 2% of the 236 documents remaining after exclusions performed by
the search engine were found to contain data pertinent to the current study. Nonetheless,
the data show that risk tradeoff is considered in a variety of public health contexts but not
usually in a manner that informs radiation policy. The fact that the principal investigator
was tasked to sort through a large number of documents from WBA was eventually
considered to benefit this study as many of the rejected documents demonstrated NRC’s
preference to PRA over comparative risk measures.
A limitation of Table 1 and the frequencies contained therein is that the data are
not valuable for resolving outright questions of popularity. For example, the PubMed
search located 18 healthcare-related items but only four radiation-related articles.
Because it is reasonable to expect healthcare-related literature to outnumber what is
published concerning environmental radiation, it would be incorrect to conclude from the
data that risk tradeoff is a far more popular concern among healthcare researchers than
persons interested in radiation risk. Moreover, the data do not show how popular RTA is
compared to other common methods of comparative risk assessment such as benefit-cost
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analysis. This limitation is accepted because questions of popularity are outside the scope
of this review.
Conclusion
RTA provides a logical framework for examining risk tradeoffs in radiation
protection, and research specifically examining risk tradeoffs relative to radiation
policymaking is needed. Nevertheless, strict application of the RTA framework in a
manner leading to a meaningful estimate of the net change in health due to radiation
rulemaking remains a complicated endeavor. Risk-risk comparisons across a diverse set
of health endpoints requires an integrated measure of risk (Gray and Hammitt 2000), and
while LLE and Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) are examples of such measures,
neither is currently suitable for aggregating across all health endpoints. Comparing risk
versus risk in radiation policymaking is further complicated because the actual effects of
low and very low doses of radiation remain unknown.
Nonetheless, research that weighs risk versus risk should not be avoided because
of such difficulties. Even when presented with incomplete information, weighing risks
according to magnitude, size of impacted population, certainty of estimates, type of
adverse outcome, distribution, and timing will move decision-making toward
optimization of overall risk (Graham and Wiener 1995). Thus, the paradigm for radiation
policymaking should be remade in a manner that relies on a framework such as RTA to
consider risk tradeoff.
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CHAPTER II
A SOCIAL-COGNITIVE CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR PREDICTING RISK
TRADEOFFS IN RADIATION POLICYMAKING
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A version of this chapter is being prepared for submission to Health Physics for
consideration.
The student developed the methodology, conducted the study, and drafted the
manuscript. The student’s Committee reviewed and approved the methodology developed
by the student and read, provided feedback, and approved the final manuscript.
Abstract
OBJECTIVE: To integrate elements of radiation-dose response, risk tradeoff
analysis, and social cognitive theory into a conceptual model that can be used to explore
and explain dose-limiting policymaking that occurs as a result of the radiation paradigm.
METHODS: Seminal literature describing risk tradeoff analysis and moral
disengagement theory are reviewed. Key constructs from each are presented alongside
evidence demonstrating the applicability of such constructs to an investigation of
radiation policymaking. A conceptual model is synthesized that demonstrates how the
current thinking about radiation is complicated by sources of risk tradeoff and unintended
behavior in a manner that leads to policymaking that ignores countervailing (nonradiation) risks.
RESULTS: Sources of risk tradeoff for which evidence is provided include
bounded roles, omitted voice, heuristics, old-technology bias, and compensating
behavior. Behaviors leading to moral disengagement for which evidence is provided
include moral justification, palliative comparison, euphemistic labeling, displacement of
responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, minimizing the consequences, dehumanization,
attribution of blame, and transformative power of moral disengagement.
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CONCLUSIONS: The integrated model predicts that well-intentioned
policymakers, informed by the radiation paradigm and facing pervasive sources of risk
tradeoff, will offer policy solutions that reduce target risk(s) within the policymaker’s
jurisdiction and ignore countervailing risk(s) outside of that person’s jurisdiction. The net
result is policies that fail to offer maximum risk protection, and optimal health outcomes
are not achieved.
Introduction
Risk Types and Tradeoffs
Risk is broadly defined as “the chance of an adverse outcome to human health,
the quality of life, or the quality of the environment” (Graham and Wiener 1995).
Specifically, risks include threats of accidents and illness and to material well-being,
happiness, privacy, mobility, and other intangible aspects of health (Graham and Wiener
1995). Risks do not present themselves as outcomes in every individual exposed; rather,
the outcomes are observed according to some probability when an entire population is
considered. Risk is not explicit to humans, as nonhuman lifeforms can also incur risk and
often do when environmental factors are involved (Suter II et al. 1995).
A target risk is the primary focus of a risk-management action (Hofstetter et al.
2002). Conversely, a countervailing risk is the chance of an adverse outcome that
presents itself in association with measures aimed at the target risk (Hofstetter et al.
2002). A risk tradeoff occurs when the portfolio of risk is changed by an action that
knowingly or inadvertently generates a countervailing risk (Graham and Wiener 1995).
Risk tradeoff is a normal consequence of everyday decision-making. For example,
a person at work has weighed the advantages gained from earning that day’s wage and
31

other ancillary benefits of employment against the risk of being injured or killed in a
traffic accident while commuting to work. Had that person observed degraded traffic
conditions due to snow or ice when leaving for work, he or she may have decided to stay
home instead. Just as each person weighs risk versus risk numerous times throughout a
single day, research examining health and environmental protections demonstrate that
risk tradeoff is a pervasive feature of policymaking (Graham and Wiener 1995).
Environmental risk management actions are often investigated in terms of
countervailing risks, and examples include examinations of chemicals, cleaners,
pesticides, pollution, traffic accidents, foodborne illness, building codes, and accidents at
work (Hammitt et al. 1999, Gray and Hammitt 2000, Calandrillo 2001, Kikuchi et al.
2011, Kishimoto 2013). Some of the nation’s laws require formal analyses as a means of
assessing and resolving risk tradeoffs; for example, the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment
requires the Environmental Protection Agency to assess its efforts to reduce risks and
report any health or environmental consequences of such actions (Rascoff and Revesz
2002). Radiation policymaking, however, is accomplished according to the paradigm that
any amount of radiation is harmful and should be avoided (GAO 2000, NAS 2006).
Policymaking informed by such a paradigm is understood to lead to important ecological,
temporal, and human health tradeoffs (Burger et al. 2004).
The Radiation Paradigm
Radiation protection recommendations worldwide, and the policies, regulations,
and regulatory guidance borne from these recommendations, are based on a presumed
linear-response relationship between radiation dose and cancer risk (Aleta 2009, Doss
2013). The linear dose-response theory was popularized in the mid-20th century and
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suggests that if a single radiation interaction with DNA, or theoretical “single-hit”, is
capable of causing mutagenesis, then more hits would result in proportionally more
damage (Cohen 2002, Calabrese 2013, Doss 2013). Since the theory is the extrapolation
of a single-hit, all radiation exposure carries some cancer risk, and there is no threshold
below which we can consider radiation to be safe (Cohen 2002). Because the theory is
primarily characterized by a linear relationship between dose and risk and the absence of
a threshold dose, it is commonly referred to as the linear-no-threshold model, or the LNT
model.
Due to the reasonably large number of cancers that occur in the absence of
radiation, there is no way to precisely determine if a single hit of radiation is what leads
to oncogenesis (Tubiana et al. 2009). Radiation epidemiology is further complicated by
the fact that radiation from natural sources including the earth’s crust and solar activity
bathe us constantly (Tubiana et al. 2009), and it is impossible to discriminate cancers
caused by natural radiation from those caused by manmade sources. Consequently, at low
doses of radiation we do not have any conclusive scientific evidence correlating dose to
adverse health effects (GAO 2000, Tubiana et al. 2009).
The meaningfulness of the previous sentence is lost unless one understands the
context in which the term “low dose” is used. According to the National Academy of
Sciences committee responsible for reporting the health risks from radiation, a low dose
is defined as a dose below 0.1 sievert (Sv) where Sv is a standard international unit of
dose equivalence (NAS 2006). While 0.1 Sv is low on the scale of doses received by the
cohort from which the Academy substantially bases its findings, atomic bomb survivors,
it is far above what a sensible person would consider a low dose. It is about the same
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dose a person would expect to receive from 10 whole body CT scans; 1,000 chest x-rays;
or 10,000 dental x-rays (HPS 2010, NRC 2017b).
There is generally consensus among scientists that cancer risk increases
proportionally with acute doses above around 0.1 Sv and protracted doses above around
0.5 Sv (Tubiana et al. 2009, Vaiserman 2010). Consensus wanes at low doses, however,
where precise evidence is lacking and the risks may be higher or lower than the linear
model or reflect a threshold at which no harmful effects are observed (GAO 2000,
Tubiana et al. 2009, Vaiserman 2010). As a result, the LNT model has competed with
other models of radiation risk since its inception (Aleta 2009). The alternate models
usually considered are a higher risk model, a lower risk model, and a threshold model
(GAO 2000). Some of the threshold models even predict a net benefit at lower doses, and
the theory that health may be improved by exposures to low levels of radiation is called
hormesis (GAO 2000, Vaiserman 2010, Doss 2013).
The reality is that the risks attributable to low levels of radiation on humans are
unknown. Epidemiological studies do not have the statistical power needed to describe
the dose–response relationship at low doses (Suzuki and Yamashita 2012). Moreover,
these risks remain unknown in the presence of data from hundreds of thousands of
diverse human subjects that have been collected over the better part of a century. That is,
the unknowingness is not because scientists lack data, but because the preponderance of
data suggest that the risk is so low that it cannot be discriminated.
Although precise evidence of low dose effects in humans remains elusive, the
literature is somehow rich with unyielding support for or against many of the doseresponse models. Faced with conflicting scientific opinion, policymakers are left to
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decide which model of radiation effects best describes the dose-response and serves the
public’s interest. Due in part to the public’s perception of the seriousness of exposure to
environmental radiation, U.S. policymaking is accomplished according to a so-called
“conservative” approach wherein it is assumed that any amount of radiation causes some
harm, and adherence to the LNT model is considered such an approach (NAS 1972,
Walker 2000).
The aim of public health is improved health outcomes through evidence-based
practices. Thus, the problem with assuming that the current paradigm is conservative is
that such a conclusion fails to consider the net effects of radiation policy. That is, if the
net effect of presumed conservative policies is poorer health outcomes as a consequence
of other exposures, degradation of the environment, or misappropriation of public funds,
then such policies fail to serve the public’s best interest and should not be deemed
conservative. The problem with seemingly conservative models is exacerbated if low
levels of radiation are actually harmless or beneficial.
This discussion of the radiation paradigm is not meant to argue for or against any
of the radiation dose-response models, and those readers seeking evidence regarding
which model is best should look elsewhere. Rather, an overview of the paradigm and
criticism is intended as a means of introducing this study aimed at examining the
policymaking behaviors exhibited as a consequence of aligning decision-making with the
current dose-response model.
Predicting Risk Tradeoffs
In broad terms, the set of tools available for analyzing the risks associated with
decision alternatives are called comparative risks analysis (Hofstetter et al. 2002).
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Hofstetter et al. examines a variety of environmental assessment tools and introduces a
subset of methods that (1) are used in comparative analysis, (2) provide a means of
analyzing risk tradeoffs, and (3) have value where decision-support is needed (rather than
monitoring-support) (Hofstetter et al. 2002). One of these tools, Risk Tradeoff Analysis
(RTA, or risk-risk analysis) is particularly well suited to assess countervailing risks that
arise from actions aimed at mitigating target risks (Viscusi 1994, Hofstetter et al. 2002).
An advantage of RTA over other methods of comparative risk assessment is that it
focuses on the risk effects of a policy rather than tradeoffs between financial costs and
health (Viscusi 1994). Where policy options are clearly not benefiting society, RTA may
offer greater promise than other approaches (Viscusi 1994).
It is hypothesized that well-intentioned policymakers, informed by the radiation
paradigm and facing pervasive sources of risk tradeoff, will offer policy solutions that
reduce target risk(s) within the policymaker’s jurisdiction and ignore countervailing
risk(s) outside of that person’s jurisdiction. The net result is policies that fail to offer
maximum risk protection, and optimal health outcomes are unlikely to be achieved.
Materials and Methods
As a means of providing a simple starting point for the current study, a model
illustrating the concept of ideal policymaking is provided by Figure 2. It is a
simplification of thinking conveyed by the Health Belief Model, which states in part that
the actions a person will take to solve a health problem are influenced by their attitudes
and knowledge (Glanz and Rimer 1997, Glanz et al. 2008). Ideally then, well-intentioned
policymakers furnished with facts about health outcomes will make decisions that benefit
the public.
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Figure 2. Ideal Policymaking
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The research of others demonstrates risk tradeoffs from which we can conclude
that radiation policymaking is not accomplished according to the ideal (Burger et al.
2004, Murakami et al. 2015, Hayakawa 2016). If we assume that policymakers’ actions
are well-intentioned, then the simple model shows that conduct leading to less than ideal
health outcomes must be informed by imperfect knowledge rather than a factual
understanding of risk. Thus, constructs from RTA and a theory of social cognitive
behavior, moral disengagement, are used to estimate an integrated conceptual model
capable of predicting risk tradeoffs in radiation policymaking. First, seminal literature
describing RTA and moral disengagement theory are reviewed for key constructs, and
such constructs are demonstrated to be factors influencing radiation policymaking.
Finally, an integrated model is synthesized.
Sources of Risk Tradeoff
The basic decision-making principle of RTA is that when all of the likely
consequences of a regulation or management option are assessed in terms of their costs
and benefits, an option presenting the lowest overall risk is selected (Hofstetter et al.
2002). RTA is pragmatic in that it is concerned with finding risk superior alternatives that
reduce overall risk rather than trading one kind of risk for another (Graham and Wiener
1995). In seeking opportunities for risk superior alternatives, it is important to understand
why risk tradeoffs occur, and according to Graham and Weiner, important sources of
tradeoffs include bounded roles, omitted voice, heuristics, old-technology bias, and
compensating behavior (Graham and Wiener 1995).
Bounded roles are an unfortunate consequence of specialization (Graham and
Wiener 1995). Structurally, the agencies responsible for mitigating risk are organized into
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pools of experts that will accomplish decision-making according to their competencies
and sometimes contrary to the expertise of organizations representing other
specializations. Countervailing risks are unlikely to respect the functional boundaries
used to discriminate agency jurisdictions.
Omitted voice is a concern when affected parties are absent from the decisionmaking process (Graham and Wiener 1995). Decision makers are less likely to consider
countervailing losses and organized interests will enjoy disproportionate influence when
impacted constituencies are not participating in the dialogue. All parties impacted by
decision-making should have a voice as a matter of practical ethics, and it is important to
consider the risks borne by nonhuman life forms, ecosystems, and future generations that
are unable to advocate for themselves.
Heuristics are the cognitive tools humans have acquired through evolution to sort
through vast amounts of information and expedite their decision-making (Graham and
Wiener 1995). The tendency is to focus on immediate concerns, leaving side effects of
decisions to be managed later. Via heuristics, recent events or crises are viewed as issues
requiring a response, even when the risk from repeat or like occurrences may be very
small.
Change is difficult, and existing, off-the-shelf technologies and methods are easier
to come by and garner support around. Where decision-making occurs in space supported
by influential organizations or industries, it can be difficult to introduce new or
competing alternatives. In these instances, old technology bias will lead to risk tradeoffs
(Graham and Wiener 1995).
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Finally, public health interventions are almost always aimed at influencing
behavior, and sometimes such influences will lead to unplanned human behavioral
responses (Graham and Wiener 1995). The target group may not perform the desired
behavior, or the desired behavior may lead to other unintended behaviors.
Moral Disengagement Theory
When discussed as a source of risk tradeoff in the usual sense, behavioral
responses are the unintended behaviors that negate reductions in the target risk. For
example, if helmet laws make motorcyclists feel safer, wearers may be more inclined to
operate their vehicles in a manner that is considered unsafe without a helmet. In addition
to behavioral responses that are characteristically unplanned, intentional behaviors are
also important to a discussion of policymaking conducted according to the radiation
paradigm. Such behaviors are examined herein with a popular social cognitive theory,
moral disengagement.
According to Bandura's moral disengagement theory, an individual exhibits moral
reasoning based on a set of embedded moral standards (2002). This reasoning guides the
individual in choosing behaviors that reflect such standards and is ultimately linked to his
or her moral action. That is, because people know right from wrong and are intrinsically
interested in acting in a moral manner, their behavior is expressed via a self-regulated
process that prevents violating a set of personally-held moral standards (Bandura 2002).
Moral disengagement refers to the psycho-social maneuvers that an individual
uses on oneself in order to bypass these self-regulating influences (Bandura 2002). Such
tricks allow an alternative set of behaviors to be interpreted as not at odds with one’s
moral character, including behaviors that would otherwise be deemed reprehensible
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(Bandura 2002). Behaviors that arise as a result of suppressing normal morality with
moral disengagement include inhumane conduct and various forms of physical, social,
and cognitive harm onto others (Bandura 2002). Moral disengagement is characterized by
constructs that express the practices one uses to accept destructive behavior.
Moral justification refers to the processes by which harmful conduct is deemed
justifiable because it serves a moral purpose (Bandura 2002). By rationalizing the
behavior in such a manner, it becomes personally and socially acceptable. Individuals
who use moral justification see themselves acting as social or moral agents that are
benefiting society (Bandura 2002).
Palliative comparison refers to the cognitive process wherein harmful conduct is
justified by comparing it against the unacceptable acts it is meant to contradict, prevent,
or eliminate (Bandura 2002). In advantageous comparison, an action that would
otherwise be suppressed by moral controls is deemed a righteous retaliatory behavior. An
example is one violent act justifying another, or “an eye for an eye” (Bandura 2002).
Euphemistic labeling is accomplished by applying language skills to soften the
moral response to harmful conduct (Bandura 2002). It includes sanitizing language; for
example, referring to human beings as “targets” or civilian deaths as “collateral damage”
in time of war (Bandura 2002). Another euphemistic tool is agentless passive voice,
wherein reprehensible conduct appears to be the work of nameless forces or inanimate
objects rather than people (Bandura 2002).
In displacement of responsibility, an individual minimizes his or her role as an
agent in the harm that is caused (Bandura 2002). The individual may cast off any
responsibility for the action if it can be attributed to a group decision, even when the
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harm comes from a group to which they belong (Bandura 2002). Similarly, an individual
may claim that they are not responsible for a harmful practice because he or she was not
the one who authorized it (Bandura 2002). Displacement of responsibility is likely to
occur when regulatory agencies are divided into groups of specialists and each group is
assigned to tackle specific risks.
Diffusion of responsibility refers to the mechanism by which personal agency is
softened by attributing responsibility to other actors (Bandura 2002). When working in a
group, individual tasks may be seen as more moral than the collective effort, making it
easier to align oneself with certain tasks (Bandura 2002). Group decision-making also
allows individuals to shirk responsibility and blame immoral behavior on others (Bandura
2002).
Minimizing, ignoring, or misconstruing the consequences is used to minimize,
disregard, or distort the impact of one's actions (Bandura 2002). Implementation of such
practices is easiest in the absence of evidence to the contrary (Bandura 2002). Thus,
individuals are less likely to be morally restrained when physical or temporal limitations
prevent them from witnessing the harm that their actions cause (Bandura 2002).
Dehumanization is used to turn off empathetic reactions that arise from our
morality (Bandura 2002). By stripping away human qualities from people or dividing
them into groups that are not like us, it is easier to treat them in a harmful manner
(Bandura 2002). Other forms of depersonalization, such as stereotyping and namecalling, are also used to justify immoral action (Bandura 2002).
Attribution of blame allows people to view themselves as victims (Bandura 2002).
Consequently, they are driven to behave in a manner that is harmful to others because of
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perceived compelling circumstances (Bandura 2002). Self-exoneration is realized
because the harmful conduct is viewed as a protective response rather than a personal
decision that would require moral control (Bandura 2002).
People are not instantly transformed into cruel actors (Bandura 2002).
Transformative power of progressive moral disengagement is the construct by which
small changes contrary to a person’s moral compass are achieved (Bandura 2002). By
starting with mildly harmful behaviors and slowly progressing to more harmful ones,
moral self-restraint is diminished until ruthless acts are possible with little or no remorse
(Bandura 2002). Through the transformative power of progressive moral disengagement,
inhumane practices become routine (Bandura 2002).
Results
Evidence of Risk Tradeoff and Moral Disengagement
Table 4 provides examples demonstrating sources of risk tradeoff and behaviors
of moral disengagement. The examples are not intended to reflect every instance where
radiation policymaking is undermined. Rather, the table is expected to validate this
study’s claim that constructs of the subject theories are germane to the resulting
integrated conceptual model.
Integrated Conceptual Model
Figure 3 conveys the model suggested by the current study. A significant
departure from the ideal model is the manner in which imperfect knowledge, i.e., the
radiation paradigm complicated by sources of risk tradeoff and moral disengagement, is
used by policymakers as a suitable approximation of factual risk to enact prescriptive
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Table 4. Theoretical Constructs and Examples from Radiation Policymaking
Theory
Risk tradeoff

Construct
Bounded roles

•

•

Omitted voice

•

•

•

Heuristics

•

•

•

•

Evidence
Bounded roles is a prominent feature of the U.S. regulatory
framework, with at least the Environmental Protection
Agency, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of
Energy, Department of Defense, Department of Health and
Human Services, Department of Labor, and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency all demonstrating some
responsibility for radiation policymaking (EPA 2000).
Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 exacerbates
the matter of bounded roles because it provides the statutory
basis under which the federal government relinquishes
portions of its regulatory authority to the states (NRC 2015).
Policies through which cleanup criteria are established are
based entirely on reducing radiation-induced risks to a
theoretical group of human receptors (NRC 2006), but
ignore actual radiation risk to ecological receptors and any
non-radiation-induced risks (NRC 2006).
Because U.S. policymaking is accomplished in a framework
characterized by bounded roles, groups with similar
expertise will hear from the same actors, share similar
viewpoints on the seriousness of avoiding the target risk,
and collectively disregard countervailing risks (Graham and
Wiener 1995).
When efforts are organized in a manner that focuses on a
singular risk, as in the case of regulations aimed at reducing
radiation-induced effects, omitted voice ensues because the
general public is not generally informed enough about the
countervailing risks to speak up against them (Graham and
Wiener 1995).
Decisions to evacuate following the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear disaster areas posing little actual radiation risk
resulted in a large number of countervailing evacuationrelated deaths (Murakami et al. 2015, Hayakawa 2016).
The incident at Fukushima Daiichi also caused some
countries to completely abandon their nuclear energy
programs amid concerns over similar radiation releases even
though such programs demonstrated impeccable safety
records and had supplied clean and reliable energy for
decades (Moniz 2011).
Humans innately accomplish relative risk-ranking according
to heuristics (Graham and Wiener 1995), and such processes
align with the assumption that all radiation is harmful and
should be avoided (Walker 2000).
Cancer, DNA lesions, and other mutagenesis are likely to
rank higher than other risks, particularly in terms of public
perception, but research shows a tremendous gap exists
between the public's perception of risk and factual accounts
of risk (Tonn et al. 1989, Vassie et al. 2005). In one analysis
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Table 4. Continued
Theory

Construct
•

Moral
disengagement

Evidence
of individual risk belief structures, researchers conclude that
“the chasm between fact and perception is most notable in
the case of nuclear power” (Tonn et al. 1989).
Adherence to “conservative” models of radiation dose
response in light of a growing body of evidence from
radiation biology indicating the efficacy of cellular repair
mechanisms (Tubiana et al. 2009).
Nuclear regulations enforce compensating behaviors via a
policy of maintaining exposures “as low as (is) reasonably
achievable” or ALARA. This policy requires nuclear
operators to make every reasonable effort to maintain
exposures to ionizing radiation as far below the dose limits
as practical, which over time has resulted in acceptance of
actions that pile conservatisms on top of other conservatisms
(GAO 2000, Walker 2000, Jones 2005).

Old technology
bias

•

Human
behavioral
responses

•

Moral
justification

•

Rulemaking accomplished according to the radiation
paradigm is routinely defended as “conservative” when such
policies may not result in an actual reduction in risk (GAO
2000, Burger et al. 2004).

Palliative
comparison

•

The target risk of dose-limiting regulations is cancer; thus, it
is easy to support compelling actions to the contrary.
Radiation’s effects are often exaggerated (Walker 2000),
and actors leveraging such embellishments are likely to
accomplish even more advantageous comparisons.

•

Euphemistic
labeling

•

The two major dose limits of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission are its “occupational dose limits” (NRC 2018c)
and “dose limits for individual members of the public”
(NRC 2018d). The former apply to nuclear workers, and the
latter apply to everyone else. This terminology serves to
separate workers from the rest of the public. What is not
immediately obvious is that working at the occupational
limit would put workers at 50 times the risk of developing a
solid cancer as would working at the public limit.

Displacement of
responsibility

•

Nuclear policymakers are tasked to reduce the risks from
radiation hazards, and other agencies are responsible for
managing the countervailing risks posed by their decisionmaking

Diffusion of
responsibility

•

In a response to the U.S. Government Accountability Office
regarding uncertainties in risk estimates at low doses of
radiation, the Environmental Protection Agency claimed
“Until the evidence suggests otherwise, EPA is simply
following the consensus of scientific organizations in
continuing to use the LNT model to estimate risks” (GAO
2000).

45

Table 4. Continued
Theory

Construct
Minimize,
ignore, or
disregard
consequences

•
•

Evidence
Nuclear policymakers disregard consequences when they
fail to consider the countervailing risks posed by their
decisions because of jurisdictional boundaries.
Cleanup of former nuclear sites is associated with important
and possibly irreversible ecological risks, and since
ecological systems cannot speak for themselves, it is easier
to disregard such risks (EPA 1978, Burger et al. 2007).

Dehumanization

•

Regulatory dose limits depend upon whether one is a worker
or member of the general public, with the former allowed to
received 50 times more dose in any given year than the latter
(NRC 2018c, NRC 2018d). Workers may be our friends,
neighbors, and family members, but separating them under a
worker label makes it easier to accept that that they are due
50 times more risk. When the public is divided into two
groups, nuclear workers and everyone else, it becomes
easier to garner support for policies that put one group at
greater risk than the other.

Attribution of
blame

•

Members of the public who live near nuclear power plants
or other potential source of environmental radiation may see
themselves as victims of big business or uninterested
governments (Walker 2000). Consequently, they may put
pressures on decision makers to implement increasing
restrictive regulations to protect them from radiation, even
when such regulations may be transferring risks elsewhere
or onto other groups.

Transformative
power of moral
disengagement

•

Decision makers are practicing transformative power of
progressive moral disengagement when they disagree with
the premise of the LNT model but support it anyway as
mechanism for conservative policymaking because it has
worked for them in the past.
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Figure 3. Conceptual Model
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dose-limiting regulations. The dotted line in the model represents an impasse defined by
jurisdictional boundaries where autonomous action is not practiced to minimize the
countervailing risks that arise. The model also suggests that as conduct leading to
policymaking is practiced, a transforming effect is observed that makes such conduct
easier to repeat. This reciprocal effect is predicted by the construct transformative power
of progressive moral disengagement that is inherent to Bandura’s theory.
Discussion
The research of others demonstrates that prescriptive policymaking accomplished
according to the radiation paradigm leads to risk tradeoffs that offset target risk
reductions. For example, in a Department of Energy funded study linking cleanup
decisions and risk tradeoffs, Burger et al. cite that in the 12 year period spanning 1989 to
2001, the Department’s own review team had determined that its environmental
management program had spent more than $60 billion without a corresponding reduction
in actual risk (Burger et al. 2004). In other contemporary research, decisions to evacuate
the Japanese prefecture surrounding the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi reactor accident are
linked to increased mortality (Murakami et al. 2015, Hayakawa 2016). Evacuations that
were undertaken to avoid radiation dose on the order of 0.02 mSv, a level commensurate
with routine medical diagnostic procedures, are believed to have caused more than 1,900
deaths from evacuation-related social stresses (Hayakawa 2016). “[D]isaster-related
deaths are undeniably an element of man-made disaster”, the authors of one article claim,
“as these individuals were saved by emergency evacuation and subsequently lost their
lives due to insufficient measures to support them” (Hayakawa 2016). Such outcomes are
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possible because decision makers have become accustomed to accomplishing radiation
policymaking in a manner that ignores countervailing risk. This is the real value of the
model predicted by the current study - the evidence-based understanding it provides of
the cognitive and behavioral factors that lead policymakers to accept the side effects of
their rulemaking.
A key limitation of the current study is that it provides little more than an
introduction of risk tradeoff in a radiation-policy context. It is hoped that by
demonstrating this model, a case is made for research and subsequent actions that will
move the model’s dotted boundary down and to the right in a manner that brings
countervailing risks into the purview of policymakers. A follow-on analysis of existing
dose-limiting regulations with RTA is an opportunity to do so, as the framework RTA
reflects is intended to shift the decision paradigm from one that concentrates solely at
reducing target risk to one that seeks a reduction across the entire portfolio of risks
(Graham and Wiener 1995).
In its consideration of target, countervailing, and coincident risk, RTA seeks to
determine the specific set of circumstances representing a “risk protection frontier” at
which an increase in protection against one risk means a decrease in protection against
the other risk when available interventions are maximally and effectively applied
(Graham and Wiener 1995). Along this frontier, risk tradeoff occurs and efforts expended
to increase protection against the target risk lead to lesser protection against
countervailing risk and vice versa. At the risk protection frontier, maximum risk
protection is achieved with the resources at hand, and “risk superior” alternatives that
reduce overall risk are needed rather than continued pressures from actions that only
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trade one risk for another (Graham and Wiener 1995). In application, there may be
multiple countervailing risks to consider, so it is useful to consider the risk protection
frontier as operating in a numerous directions (Graham and Wiener 1995).
RTA has been used to assess a variety of health and environmental risks
(Hammitt et al. 1999, Gray and Hammitt 2000, Calandrillo 2001, Kikuchi et al. 2011,
Kishimoto 2013), but in terms of tradeoffs caused by policymaking that protects the
public from radioactive hazards, the literature is silent. Instead, contemporary research
informing the field of radiation protection seems overwhelmingly set on target-risk
reductions and resolving which of the dose-response models best predicts the association
between low-level radiation and cancer incidence. Policies that continue to ignore
countervailing risks will not achieve maximum protection along the risk protection
frontier. Such policies represent a systematic failure to see the “whole patient”, where the
term “patient” implies the person, population, ecosystem, or combination thereof
impacted by the intervention (Graham and Wiener 1995).
Society agrees to regulations under the premise that such regulations are issued in
society's best interest, and where a regulation will do more harm than good, it should not
be pursued, irrespective of its benefit to a singular risk and apart from any political
motivation (Viscusi 1994). Consequently, research is needed that seeks to determine the
net effect of radiation policymaking. For example, research by others connects
environmental cleanup activities and risk tradeoffs (Burger et al. 2004, Burger et al.
2007), but the connections are yet to be well quantified due to a lack of comparable risk
measures. Risk occurs across a diverse set of health endpoints, and a suitable measure for
aggregating across all endpoints is difficult to define (Gray and Hammitt 2000).
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Comparing radiation’s risks against other risks is further complicated because the actual
effects of low doses of radiation are unknown and may remain so for the foreseeable
future. Thus, continued research into risk comparison measures and the effects of low
dose radiation are also needed.
Conclusion
Absent a completely factual understanding of the radiation-induced health effects
attributable to low-dose radiation, policymakers are left to decide which model of
presumed effects best serves the interests of the public. Contemporary policymaking is
accomplished according to the paradigm that any amount of radiation dose is harmful, a
premise that some claim will lead to risk tradeoffs because it ignores research from
radiation biology demonstrating cellular repair and the harmful effects of overregulation.
Although risk tradeoff is understood to be a pervasive feature of health and
environmental policymaking, the extent to which radiation rulemaking results in
countervailing risks is not well researched. It seems clear from at least an exploratory
analysis with popular methods of comparative risk assessment and social cognitive theory
that radiation policymaking is complicated by certain social and behavioral phenomenon
that are known to lead to risk tradeoffs. Because of these findings, research
demonstrating the net health effect of radiation rulemaking is needed to determine if a
shift in the policymaking paradigm is substantiated. As the integrated model predicted by
this study demonstrates, an appropriate paradigm shift would push countervailing risks
into the purview of decision makers. Doing so would upset many of the sources of risk
tradeoff and lead toward risk-superior rulemaking, even in the face of ongoing
uncertainty related to radiation’s low-dose effects.
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CHAPTER III
A CRITIQUE OF U.S. LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY USING
DATA FROM CYCLOTRON DECOMMISSIONING PROJECTS
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A version of this chapter is being prepared for submission to Health Physics for
consideration
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Abstract
OBJECTIVE: This study makes a case for parity in U.S. radioactive waste
policymaking by presenting and interpreting data from cyclotron decommissioning
projects.
METHODS: Records from 11 cyclotron sites previously decommissioned provide
data conveying the characteristics of residual radioactivity in concrete bioshielding. The
dose potential associated with concrete from each site is determined with the RESRADBUILD computer code. The resulting doses are (1) compared against the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission’s radiological criteria for unrestricted use and (2) translated into
population-risk by applying popular risk estimates from the National Research Council of
the National Academy of Sciences. Other data to help frame the concern regarding waste
from these projects are presented, including an estimate of the waste volume generated by
each site.
RESULTS: Calculated dose equivalents ranged from 0.01 to 43.2 mSv y-1 and
correspond to a risk of 0.1 to 432 extra cases of solid cancer or leukemia per 100,000
persons. Waste from nine of the sites (82%) exceeds the 0.25 mSv y-1 dose limit specified
in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s radiological criteria for unrestricted use.
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CONCLUSION: According to an international inventory, approximately 350
cyclotrons were believed to be operating worldwide in 2006. These sites do not operate
forever, and when they are vacated, decommissioning activities including remediation
and demolition are used to make them safe for reuse. These activities generate waste that
is not regulated as low-level radioactive waste according to U.S. policy, but would be if
generated at a reactor site instead of by a cyclotron.
Introduction
Cyclotrons are particle accelerators; they use electromagnetic forces to propel
subatomic particles. The particles are accelerated as a means of achieving a desirable
increase in energy, and the energized particles are bombarded against select targets.
Desirable nuclear transformations are caused in target materials when the incoming beam
of particles, usually protons or deuterons, displaces other subatomic particles. Neutrons
that are ejected from incident nuclei go on to cause unintended nuclear transformations in
other materials, including those comprising the building structure, the cyclotron, and
ancillary support equipment. The materials impinged by neutrons become radioactive in
the process. Since the particle beam is not perfectly efficient, any losses (i.e., stray
particles) will cause similar transformations and induced radioactivity in whatever
adjacent materials are impacted.
Cyclotrons and the facilities in which they are used do not operate indefinitely,
and when such facilities are vacated, cleanup activities are accomplished including
remediation and demolition. The term “decommissioning” is used to describe these and
other activities that are enacted to reduce residual radioactivity and make the site safe for
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reuse (NRC 2018a). Activities comprising the decommissioning process generate
radioactive waste material that the public expects to have managed in its best interest.
In a 2018 critique of U.S. nuclear waste policymaking, data were presented to
demonstrate the similarities between wastes from one reactor and two cyclotron sites
(Hansen 2018). The data in that critique were comprised of radioisotopic activity
concentrations in concrete bioshielding, and were used to show how wastes from three
sites presenting virtually identical radiological hazards were regulated in a manner
leading to very different long-term management solutions. The calculated dose
equivalents from residual radioactivity in concrete were 2.75 millisieverts per year (mSv
y-1) for the reactor site and 0.778 and 4.91 mSv y-1 for the cyclotron sites (Hansen 2018).
The corresponding overall risk of solid cancer or leukemia across all three sites was 8 to
50 extra cases per 100,000 persons (Hansen 2018).
Dose calculations in the previous study were based on pathway analysis using the
RESRAD-BUILD computer code. The code was developed by Argonne National
Laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy and is specifically designed to analyze
human radiation exposures resulting from occupation of radiologically contaminated
building (Resrad.evs.anl.gov n.d.). RESRAD-BUILD is additionally approved by the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for use in evaluating contaminated
buildings that will be decommissioned and released from regulatory control
(Resrad.evs.anl.gov n.d.). The dose outputs from RESRAD-BUILD were translated to
risk with estimates published by the National Research Council of the National Academy
of Sciences. A limitation of the previous study is that because it was intended to serve as
an exploratory analysis, it only examined wastes from two cyclotron sites (Hansen 2018).
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Moreover, although the data were assumed to reflect typical activity concentrations, the
sites were selected as a matter of convenience rather than according to a specific
methodology.
The current study aims to improve upon conclusions from previous research by
examining data from 11 cyclotron closeouts accomplished by an NRC-licensed
decontamination and decommissioning firm, Ameriphysics, LLC (Ameriphysics). This
previously unpublished dataset summarizing Ameriphysics’ commercial experience is
important as it reflects post shutdown radiological data from a variety of uniquely
configured, operated, and located cyclotron facilities.
Radioactive Waste Disposal Regulations
The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 transferred federal responsibility for
regulating commercially generated U.S. radioactive wastes onto the NRC (NRC 2015).
How the NRC regulates waste is determined by which of four broad classifications it falls
into. Categories include high-level waste, low-level waste, uranium mill tailings, and
waste incidental to reprocessing, where the latter refers to certain waste that results from
reprocessing spent nuclear fuel (NRC 2017c).
Regulations pertaining to disposal of high-level radioactive waste are found in 10
CFR §§ 60 and 63. These wastes are irradiated reactor fuel, waste resulting from
reprocessing irradiated reactor fuel, and other highly radioactive waste that require
permanent isolation. These wastes are intended to be disposed in a facility that is part of a
geologic repository. In its Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the U.S. Congress outlined
a plan for managing high-level waste (NRC 2015).
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Regulations pertaining to the licensing requirements for land disposal of low-level
radioactive waste are found in 10 CFR § 61. Low-level waste is radioactive waste that is
not classified as high-level waste, transuranic waste, spent nuclear fuel, or certain
byproduct materials (NRC 2018g). Disposal of low-level waste occurs at or near the
ground’s surface. Consequently, these wastes are “classed” according to 10 CFR § 61.55
(NRC 2018h). Class A low-level waste is the most innocuous of the classifications, and it
is waste that does not require stabilization or segregation (NRC 2018h). Class B lowlevel waste presents a greater hazard than Class A and must be structurally stable (NRC
2018h). Class C low-level waste presents a greater hazard than Class B, and requires both
structural stability and measures at the disposal facility to protect against inadvertent
intrusion (NRC 2018h).
Waste that is greater than Class C is not acceptable for near-surface disposal and
must be disposed in a geologic repository designed for high-level waste (NRC 2018h).
According to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the U.S. Department of Energy is
responsible for siting, constructing, and operating such repositories, and the NRC is
responsible approving or disapproving applications to construct, license, and close them
(NRC 2015).
Certain byproduct materials are not regulated as either high-level or low-level
waste. These materials are defined in 10 CFR § 20.1003 and include mill tailings from
uranium or thorium ore, discrete sources of 226Ra, material that has been made
radioactive by use of a particle accelerator, and other discrete sources of naturally
occurring radioactive material other than source material (NRC 2018a). Disposal of these
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materials is not regulated except at the state-level and then only when the state chooses to
do so.
Cyclotron Waste and Prevailing U.S. Radioactive Waste Policy
According to the definition of waste used throughout the rulemaking promulgated
by the NRC, any material that has been made radioactive by use of a particle accelerator
is exempted from the regulations pertaining to radioactive waste (NRC 2018a, NRC
2018g, NRC 2018f). Since cyclotrons are particle accelerators, their waste need not be
disposed in the same manner as waste generated at reactor facilities, even though such
wastes may be indistinguishable in terms of radiological content and corresponding
health risk. Meanwhile, according to the rules of other federal agencies, specifically the
U.S. Department of Labor (via the Occupational Safety and Health Administration) and
the U.S. Department of Transportation, radioactive materials are regulated according to
the severity of the hazard they present (Hansen 2018). That is, it seems wastes are
regulated by the NRC according to the type of site responsible for generating the hazard,
whereas other agencies regulate radioactive material according to its radionuclidespecific concentration and potential for adverse health risk (DOT 2008, DOL 2018a).
According to an inventory published by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), approximately 350 cyclotrons were believed to be operating worldwide in 2006
(2006a). These sites will eventually close, and with such a large number of closures
looming, the value of the current study is that it provides an opportunity to make a mostly
prospective examination of the health risks associated with continuing to dispose of
cyclotrons according to exiting U.S. policies and resulting regulations.
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U.S. radioactive waste policies are public health policies. A principal goal of
public health is to seek out and eliminate disparities, or situations where health outcomes
are expected to be observed in a greater or lesser extent between populations
(Healthypeople.gov 2018). Where some wastes are controlled with regulations in manner
that minimizes public exposures and other wastes presenting the same health risk are not,
an examination of disparity is warranted.
This study is not a call for more or less regulation; rather, it proposes that U.S.
radioactive waste policies intended to benefit the public’s health should be risk-based. If
cyclotron decommissioning waste presents a risk commensurate with other material
classed as low-level radioactive waste, then the same rules for disposal should apply,
regardless of whether those rules result in more or less regulation for waste from a
specific group of licensees. That is, either stricter rules for cyclotron waste or fewer rules
for low-level waste from reactor sites and other material licensees would resolve existing
disparities.
Materials and Methods
Description of Data
Ameriphysics has completed 25 projects requiring some form of cyclotron
removal, replacement, or dispositioning since the firm’s inception in 2008 until the
present day. Because these projects were accomplished for purposes other than a critique
of U.S. nuclear policymaking, not all of these projects were expected to provide robust
quantitative data from which meaningful side-by-side comparisons are possible.
Nonetheless, the records from all 25 sites were reviewed and scrutinized, and ultimately,
data of sufficient quality was recovered from 11 projects for this study.
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Similarly, the nature of the projects conducted by Ameriphysics constrain any
robust analysis to investigations of concrete. The rooms in which cyclotrons are housed
are constructed of concrete, and these concrete “vaults” serve as bioshields by attenuating
the neutron and gamma radiations that are observed during operation. The bioshields are
often characterized with robust methods as a means of demonstrating that the area is
suitable for some other use or release from radiological control. In such instances,
samples of known geometry are collected and controlled in accordance with strict quality
procedures. The samples are subsequently prepared and analyzed by an accredited
radiochemical laboratory. In contrast, only those concise data necessary to achieve sitespecific objectives were usually collected from the radioactive equipment used or kept
inside the bioshielding. For example, analogous comparison is sometimes used to
estimate the source term of the cyclotron and ancillary support equipment. Although such
estimates provide a suitable means for accomplishing site activities related to closeout,
they are not sufficiently rigorous for comparative analysis. That is, if the data from one
site are used to predict the data from another site in lieu of a separate collection activity,
erroneous conclusions are possible.
Certain circumstances related to the collection and analysis of concrete samples
remain site specific. Samples from different sites are analyzed by different contract
laboratories. Those laboratories sometimes base their analyses on customer-defined
libraries, and other times they use their own. Consequently, laboratory reports are rarely
identical in terms of the search criteria they reflect. Nonetheless, the data are valuable to
a study examining waste policy as they convey principal contaminants, isotopic
concentrations, and uncertainty.
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Site Specification
The 25 projects reflecting the entire commercial cyclotron experience of
Ameriphysics were reviewed for evidence indicating that the scope included activities
leading to concrete characterization, remediation, and waste management. In 10 of the 25
cyclotron projects, the situation defining the work was such that bioshielding was not
sampled; for example, if the room was to be reused for radioactive material storage,
closeout sampling was unnecessary. Concrete characterization data from the remaining
15 projects were examined to determine the representativeness of results. That is,
operational concerns sometimes interfere with implementation of an ideal sampling
strategy, as in the case of sites where the cyclotron cannot be removed prior to room
characterization. In such instances, samples may not be retrieved from beneath or behind
the machine where significant neutron activation is possible due to beam losses, and the
missing data would potentially lead to lower dose estimates and biased conclusions. Four
of the remaining 15 projects were impacted by such concerns of validity, leaving 11 of
the originally identified 25 projects to contribute data to the analysis. Thus, in terms of
high quality data relevant to the current study, these 11 projects are considered to reflect
the entirety of Ameriphysics’ cyclotron decommissioning experience (i.e., no high
quality cases are omitted).
Data Compilation, Transformation, and Analysis
Data pertinent to the current study – principal contaminants, activity
concentration, and uncertainty - are extracted from radiochemical laboratory reports and
summarized herein. The laboratory reports are owned by Ameriphysics, but the analyses
themselves were carried out by subcontract laboratories. Because of inter- and intra61

laboratory differences in how the data were reported, the compiled data are not a strict
repetition of primary data sources. Rather, the radionuclides detected in any of the
samples were listed in the leftmost column, and the resulting matrix of site versus
radionuclide was populated with data from the laboratory reports. Consequently, the table
demonstrates instances where the radionuclide was not detected (ND) or reported (NR)
where the latter reflects missing data. The cyclotron make and model are included atop
each column of data, but the site owner and location are intentionally unidentified and
remain so throughout this analysis as a measure of confidentiality.
The characterization strategy and therefore the number of samples differed from
site to site based on project-specific objectives. As an objective of examining
radioisotopic data in this study is to make a decision as to whether residual radioactivity
is present in excess of the NRC’s radiological criteria for unrestricted use (10 CFR §
20.1402), the sample from each site reflecting the highest cumulative activity is used. The
purpose of examining maximum concentrations is not to decide which cyclotron-type
poses the most risk as the data are not valuable or comparable in that manner. Rather, the
value of the data is that it can be used to decide (1) if cyclotron sites are impacted by the
same contaminants, (2) if such contaminants are the same as expected from reactor sites,
and (3) if remediation is needed to meet the usual federal regulatory criterion that allows
release from radiological controls.
As a means of transforming the data in a manner that benefits a critique of
policymaking, the RESRAD-BUILD computer code is used to compute dose equivalent,
and the resulting dose is compared against the NRC’s cleanup standard and translated to
cancer risk using popular estimates published by the National Research Council of the
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National Academy of Sciences. Project records were also searched for other data to help
frame the concern regarding waste from cyclotron decommissioning projects, including
an estimate of the waste volume attributed to each site and factors impacting waste
volume.
Results
Concrete Radiological Data
Data from analytical laboratory reports showing residual radioactivity
concentration in 5 cm diameter x 15 cm deep (nominal) concrete core samples are used to
populate Table 5 for Sites 1 through 11. The data must be considered in context; else,
they do not seem to demonstrate that the sites are impacted by the same contaminants.
The CS-22 cyclotron operated at Site 4, for example, was shut down in 2000, almost 12
years prior to characterization. Thus, it is reasonable that contaminants exhibiting a halflife of a few years or less have decayed to negligible levels. The characterization sample
from Site 10 did not return detectable concentrations of 154Eu, but this contaminant is
only expected to be present in small concentrations relative to 60Co and 152Eu, as
demonstrated by the other site operating a Siemens Eclipse, Site 2. Finally, 55Fe and 3H
were not reported for any except two sites, but that is because the teams characterizing
the sites assumed the results would be negligible in terms of dose based on measurements
acquired during operation. Given these factors and the relative magnitude of each
radionuclide in individual samples, the concrete waste from cyclotron sites is considered
to be impacted primarily by long-lived 60Co, 152Eu, and 154Eu.
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Table 5. Radiological Data by Facility
Activity in Bq g-1 (2 Sigma Uncertainty) or ND and MDC Value when < MDC

Isotope
Half-Life
(ICRP 2008)
108m

Ag
418 y
109

Cd

Site 1:
GE
MINItrace

Site 2:
Siemens
Eclipse

Site 3:
IBA
Cyclone 30

Site 4:
Cyclotron
Corp. CS-22

Site 5:
GE
PETtrace

Site 6:
Custom
Unit

Site 7:
IBA
Cyclone 30

Site 8:
GE
PETtrace

NR

NR

NR

NR

1.70 x 10-1

NR

ND

ND

-2

(4.26 x 10 )
NR

NR

NR

NR

Co

6.99 x 10-2

NR

Co

70.86 d
60

Co

5.2713 y
134

Cs

2.0648 y
152

Eu

13.537 y
154

Eu

8.593 y
155

Eu

4.7611 y
55

Fe

NR

NR

-3

271.74 d
58

6.62 x 10-1

NR

(3.44 x 10-1)

461.4 d
57

< 3.16 x 10

1.97 x 10-1

NR

-1

(2.21 x 10 )

(1.80 x 10 )

ND

ND

7.15 x 100

< 5.85 x 10-4

< 3.53 x 10-3

(6.14 x 10-2)

5.33 x 10-3

2.41 x 10-1

1.04 x 101

(1.24 x 10-3)

(5.77 x 10-3)

ND

Fe

44.495 d

ND

< 7.07 x 10

-3

< 8.07 x 10

Site 11:
Scanditronix
MC-40

ND
-3

ND

< 2.27 x 10

-3

< 3.89 x 10-3

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

< 8.07 x 10-2

< 1.45x 10-1

< 1.97 x 10-1

< 4.92 x 10-2

< 8.99 x 10-3

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

< 9.77 x 10

-3

< 5.18 x 10

-3

< 2.97 x 10

-2

< 1.67 x 10

-3

< 1.39 x 10-2

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

< 1.29 x 10-2

< 5.00 x 10-3

< 1.15 x 10-2

< 1.34 x 10-2

< 3.66 x 10-3

< 6.22 x 10-3

5.37 x 100

7.96 x 100

2.00 x 100

1.88 x 10-1

4.48 x 10-1

6.70 x 10-1

8.81 x 10-2

4.51 x 10-2

(6.11 x 10-2)

(9.77 x 10-3)

(6.11 x 10-1)

(1.90 x 10-2)

(7.59 x 10-3)

(1.82 x 10-2)

(2.15 x 10-2)

(5.74 x 10-3)

(6.44 x 10-3)

3.04 x 10-2

2.29 x 100

NR

3.30 x 10-1

4.07 x 10-1

1.49 x 10-2

9.07 x 10-2

2.48 x 10-2

1.43 x 10-2

ND

< 6.92 x 10-4

(4.26 x 10-3)

(4.55 x 10-2)

(4.22 x 10-2)

(1.05 x 10-2)

(4.81 x 10-3)

(1.27 x 10-2)

(1.46 x 10-2)

(4.74 x 10-3)

< 6.36 x 10-3

8.81 x 10-3

2.30 x 10-1

4.74 x 101

1.03 x 101

8.29 x 100

1.84 x 100

7.84 x 10-1

8.55 x 10-1

3.60 x 100

1.61 x 10-1

6.03 x 10-1

(3.81 x 10-3)

(9.62 x 10-3)

(1.86 x 10-1)

(3.03 x 10-1)

(5.14 x 10-1)

(3.33 x 10-2)

(2.04 x 10-2)

(3.92 x 10-2)

(6.55 x 10-2)

(1.36 x 10-2)

(2.81 x 10-2)

ND

3.17 x 10-2

5.07 x 100

7.22 x 10-1

7.55 x 10-1

3.81 x 10-1

8.14 x 10-2

1.09 x 10-1

4.40 x 10-1

ND

3.13 x 10-2

< 2.49 x 10-3

(4.44 x 10-3)

(1.44 x 10-1)

(1.34 x 10-2)

(9.81 x 10-2)

(3.45 x 10-2)

(1.16 x 10-2)

(2.57 x 10-2)

(3.51 x 10-2)

< 1.30 x 10-2

(1.53 x 10-2)

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND

ND
< 2.76 x 10

NR

1.94 x 10

-3

NR

NR

-1

-2

(1.09 x 10 )
NR

NR

3.26 x 10

-1

NR

(7.22 x 10 )

< 3.39 x 10

NR

NR

-2

< 1.22 x 10

-2

2.10 x 100

< 2.21 x 10

-2

NR

< 3.10 x 10

-2

NR

< 7.18 x 10

-3

NR

ND
< 1.46 x 10

3.51 x 10-1

ND
-3

< 7.14 x 10

-3

-2

(9.69 x 10 )

NR

1.23 x 100
-1

(1.12 x 10 )

ND
< 2.68 x 10
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-2

< 9.07 x 10

< 4.18 x 10-1
2.12 x 10-2

ND
-3

< 1.36 x 10-2
ND

(3.53 x 10-1)

2.737 y
59

Site 10:
Siemens
Eclipse

< 6.25 x 10-2

-1

NR

-3

Site 9:
GE
PETtrace

-2

(1.99 x 10 )

4.85 x 10-2

ND
< 2.28 x 10

-2

-2

(1.02 x 10 )

ND
< 1.13 x 10-2

Table 5. Continued
Activity in Bq g-1 (2 Sigma Uncertainty) or ND and MDC Value when < MDC

Isotope
Half-Life
(ICRP 2008)
3

H

Site 1:
GE
MINItrace

Site 2:
Siemens
Eclipse

Site 3:
IBA
Cyclone 30

Site 4:
Cyclotron
Corp. CS-22

Site 5:
GE
PETtrace

Site 6:
Custom
Unit

Site 7:
IBA
Cyclone 30

Site 8:
GE
PETtrace

Site 9:
GE
PETtrace

Site 10:
Siemens
Eclipse

Site 11:
Scanditronix
MC-40

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

8.58 x 10-1

NR

NR

NR

1.92 x 10-1

-1

12.32 y
54

Mn

313.12 d
22

Na

2.6019 y
95

Nb

ND
< 8.99 x 10

-4

< 3.52 x 10

-3

3.53 x10-1

ND
< 8.44 x 10

1.18 x 100

ND

-4

NR

Sb

NR

-2

(5.74 x 10 )
NR

NR

-3

(3.06 x 10 )
2.17 x 10-1

NR

NR

-2

34.991 d
124

(5.66 x 10 )
NR

NR

NR

Sc

83.79 d
65

Zn

244.06 d

9.10 x 100

1.96 x 10-1

1.12 x 10-2

-1

-2

-3

(1.20 x 10 )

(4.37 x 10 )

< 1.06 x 10

2.75 x 10-1

7.51 x 10-1

2.87 x 10-2

ND

-2

-2

-3

(3.63 x 10 )

(1.75 x 10 )

(4.07 x 10 )

< 1.44 x 10

5.96 x 10-2

NR

ND

ND

(3.77 x 10 )
NR

< 5.03 x 10

3.52 x 10-1

NR

(5.29 x 10 )

< 7.70 x 10

-4

ND
< 1.15 x 10

3.03 x 100

NR

-3

NR

-1

(1.06 x 10 )
1.01 x 10-2

2.60 x 100

-3

-1

(6.66 x 10 )

(1.91 x 10 )

NR

< 3.04 x 10

8.29 x 100

1.62 x 10-1

-1

-2

(1.44 x 10 )

< 5.00 x 10

1.21 x 100

1.34 x 10-1

ND

-1

-2

(2.87 x 10 )
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< 2.05 x 10

-2

-2

-3

-2

-2

< 9.84 x 10

< 1.22 x 10

ND

< 3.54 x 10

ND

ND

< 2.31 x 10

-2

-3

< 1.24 x 10

< 2.66 x 10

< 6.07 x 10

< 8.99 x 10-3
ND

< 3.70 x 10

-3

ND
-3

< 6.29 x 10-3
ND

-3

ND
-2

ND
-2

ND

(1.72 x 10 )

ND
-3

ND
-3

ND

(6.29 x 10 )

(1.39 x 10 )

-3

ND

-2

ND

2.19 x 10-1

ND

(8.66 x 10 )

-2

60.20 d
46

(1.01 x 10-1)

(2.61 x 10 )

< 6.29 x 10-3
ND

< 5.66 x 10

-3

1.18 x 10-1

4.66 x 10-2

8.95 x 10-2

-2

-2

-3

< 8.84 x 10-3
ND

(1.36 x 10 )

(1.27 x 10 )

(7.07 x 10 )

< 6.29 x 10-3

ND

ND

3.50 x 10-2

ND

< 2.76 x 10

-2

< 2.63 x 10

-2

-3

(9.07 x 10 )

< 1.41 x 10-2

Dose Equivalence
Residual radioactivity in concrete is transformed to dose equivalent in units of
mSv y-1 with the RESRAD-BUILD computer code, Version 3.5. The code considers
exposures from direct external radiation, inhalation, and incidental ingestion of
contaminated dust to determine the radiation dose associated with residual radioactivity
in contaminated buildings (Yu et al. 2003, Resrad.evs.anl.gov n.d.). Except for the
radionuclides and concentrations from Table 5, the code was operated with its preloaded
defaults for all parameters. Thus, the geometry of the source to which the characterization
data are applied is assumed to be a concrete volume of 5.4 m3 (a 36 m2 circular area x 15
cm deep) with a density of 2.4 g cc-1 (Yu et al. 2003). The default model also assumes
that the entire radioactive volume erodes at a rate of 2.40 x 10-8 centimeters per day in a
manner that, over time, releases 10% of the radioactivity into the air in the respirable
particulate range (Yu et al. 2003).
In cases where the data were ND and NR, the corresponding radionuclide is not
used as an input to the RESRAD-BUILD model. The output equivalent dose is lower
than would be achieved by using reported results, the detection limit when ND, or
assuming a value when NR. This is deemed an appropriate data management solution, as
the question this study seeks to answer is resolved without presuming the presence of
radioactivity. That is, the added dose would only further support conclusions that are
already possible whereas the reverse would not necessarily be true.
The dose-outputs of the RESRAD-BUILD code are captured in Table 6. The code
will not perform calculations for tritium (3H) at the same time as other radionuclides.
Thus, in the two instances where characterization data included tritium, the code was
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Table 6. Site Characteristics
Dose from
RESRADBUILD
(mSv y-1)

Site
Site 1:
GE
MINItrace
Site 2:
Siemens
Eclipse
Site 3:
IBA
Cyclone 30
Site 4:
Cyclotron
Corp. CS-22
Site 5:
GE
PETtrace
Site 6:
Custom
208 MeV
Site 7:
IBA
Cyclone 30
Site 8:
GE
PETtrace
Site 9:
GE
PETtrace
Site 10:
Siemens
Eclipse
Site 11:
Scanditronix
MC-40

1
2

Dose from
Co, 152Eu,
154
Eu
(mSv y-1)

Risk relative
to
unrestricted
use criterion

Cancer
incidence per
100,000
people

Waste
volume (m3)

Self-shielded

Cyclotron
disposed

1.17 x 10-2

1.17 x 10-2

0.05

0.1

0.1

Yes

No

4.89 x 10-1

4.51 x 10-1

1.8

4.5

2.2

Yes

No

4.56 x 101

4.32 x 101

172.8

432

2257.5

No

Yes

1.30 x 101

1.30 x 101

52.0

130

287.8

No

Yes 1

1.63 x 101

1.51 x 101

60.4

151

149.0

No

Yes

4.91 x 100

3.78 x 100

15.1

37.8

476.8

No

Yes

7.78 x 10-1

7.34 x 10-1

2.9

7.3

65.6

No

Yes

1.18 x 100

1.11 x 100

4.4

11.1

7.5

Yes

No

3.25E+00

3.16E+00

12.6

31.6

11.6

Yes

Yes 2

2.18 x 10-1

2.02 x 10-1

0.8

2.0

1.7

Yes

No

4.21 x 10-1

4.20 x 10-1

1.7

4.2

48.1

No

Yes

60

Cyclotron previously disposed, and volume not captured in estimate.
Cyclotron disposed, but integrated shields shipped to another site for reuse.
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operated twice, once with and once without tritium, and the results were summed to
determine dose equivalent. To demonstrate that most of the dose is attributable to 60Co,
152

Eu, and 154Eu, the code was operated a final time for each site using only those

radionuclides. These results, i.e., the site-specific doses from 60Co, 152Eu, and 154Eu, were
translated to risk relative to the NRC’s radiological criteria for unrestricted use, 0.25 mSv
y-1, and to cancer risk using estimates published by the National Academy of Sciences.
Radiological Criteria for Unrestricted Use
Specific controls, such as access restrictions, are used at operating nuclear sites to
provide protections against undue risks from radiation and radioactive materials (NRC
2018a). Decommissioning is the formal process to safely remove a site from service and
to have such controls lifted (NRC 2018a). At NRC-regulated sites seeking to remove all
access restrictions, cleanup is accomplished during decommissioning until the residual
radioactivity that is distinguishable from background radiation results in a total effective
dose equivalent that does not exceed 0.25 mSv y-1 (NRC 2018e). Thus, this criterion for
unrestricted use is valuable to the current study in that it provides a numerical basis
against which dose outputs from RESRAD-BUILD are compared.
That is, a site demonstrating a dose equivalent of greater than 0.25 mSv y-1 above
background when its radioisotopic data are transformed with RESRAD-BUILD is
expected to undergo remediation that generates waste, and such waste is disposed
according to prevailing policy. Moreover, judgments against the unrestricted use criterion
allow calculation of meaningful quantitative conclusions. For example, a site
demonstrating a total effective dose equivalent of 0.50 mSv y-1 is said to be twice the
cleanup limit whereas a site demonstrating 0.125 mSv y-1 is one-half.
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Nine of the 11 site evaluations with RESRAD-BUILD returned results exceeding the
NRC’s radiological criteria for unrestricted use and required cleanup before they could be
released from radiological control. The calculated dose for concrete from Site 3 is the
highest, more than 170 times NRC’s criteria, and the calculated doses for Sites 4, 5, 6,
and 9 were more than 10 times the criteria.
Cancer Incidence
Dose-equivalent units are not convenient for communicating health risks to the
greater public. Consequently, risk is inferred from a 2006 report entitled Health Risks
from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, BEIR VII, Phase 2. This report,
commonly called BEIR VII, predicts that on average, one in 100 people would develop a
solid cancer or leukemia from a dose of 100 mSv once U.S. sex and age distributions are
considered (NAS 2006). As an example of how such translation is valuable, the dose
attributed to 60Co, 152Eu, 154Eu in concrete for Site 3, 43.2 mSv y-1, corresponds to 432
extra cases of solid cancers or leukemia per year per 100,000 persons when BEIR VII
inferences are used.
Due in part to the speculative nature of the BEIR VII risk estimates, several
scientific organizations including the Health Physics Society and the American
Association of Physicists in Medicine have warned against multiplying such estimates by
large populations to make sensational claims about cancer risks from low doses of
radiation (Hendee and O’Connor 2012). The objective of predicting cancer incidence in
the current analysis is not sensationalism; rather it is to critique policymaking that is
accomplished according to the paradigm such estimates represent. Thus, BEIR VII
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estimates are used, but their speculative nature is accepted as an important limitation that
is discussed in greater detail following a presentation of results.
Other Data
Table 6 is populated with other data that are valuable for understanding each site
and factors related to waste management. The total waste volume associated with each
project is estimated from transfer paperwork and is provided to convey the magnitude of
the policymaking concern such disposal represents. These waste estimates should be
considered minimum volumes as shipping records do not account for material that was
recycled or disposed via landfills as allowed by regulations that exempt cyclotron wastes.
When contemplating the volume of waste these projects generate, it is useful to know that
1 cubic meter of standard concrete weighs approximately 2.7 tons and 1 cubic meter of
steel weights approximately 8.7 tons.
Important waste minimizing elements are also recognized. Some sites are
configured with integrated shields that lessen neutron-induced radioactivity in structural
surfaces in all except the downward vector, and such sites are said to be “self-shielded”.
In some instances, cyclotrons are transferred to other sites after shutdown where they can
be reused or rummaged for spare parts in lieu of disposal.
Discussion
As the results in Table 6 demonstrate, the concrete bioshielding at all except two
sites were impacted by residual radioactivity in concentrations capable of delivering a
dose above the NRC’s release criterion. Moreover, much of the dose is attributable to
neutron-induced 60Co, 152Eu, and 154Eu. These findings are not unique to cyclotron sites,
as reactor bioshielding is also known to contain these principal contaminants in levels
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sufficient to require remediation (Hansen 2018). In fact, the data reflected throughout
Table 5 are so similar to residual radioactivity expected in reactor bioshielding that it is
unlikely that even the most experienced health-physicist would be able to determine,
explicitly, that the data were obtained from cyclotron sites without the headings and
narrative accompanying the table (Hansen 2018).
The fact that the wastes representing irradiated concrete at cyclotron and reactor
sites are virtually identical is not a novel concept. Nuclear reactors and cyclotrons are
devices that emit neutron radiation as they perform the function for which they were
designed, and the process through which neutrons go on to cause other materials to
become radioactive is well understood. Induced radioactivity, due to nuclear
transformations in the devices themselves, surrounding equipment, and building materials
is observed as a function of proximity to the neutron source. The transformed materials
are said to become activated, meaning that they are now residually radioactive, and
remain so even after the radiation-producing machinery is shut off.
Although the data in Table 5 describe residual radioactivity in bioshielding, the
judgment that cyclotrons and reactors produce similar wastes should not be limited to
concrete. Induced radioactivity in steel, other metals, water, plastic, wood, drywall, and
every other material occurs according to a well understood concept of nuclear and
particle physics that is used to express the likelihood of interaction between an incident
neutron and a target nucleus, neutron cross section. The standard unit for measuring the
cross section is the barn, which is equal to 1 x 10-28 m2, and the larger the neutron cross
section, the more likely a neutron will react with the nucleus. Thus, the extent to which a
material is activated is a consequence of its intrinsic isotopic constituency rather than the
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source of neutrons (i.e., reactor or cyclotron) when the neutron flux and energy are
constant.
Critique Using Data from Cyclotron Sites
In review, nuclear fuel and wastes that were generated adjacent to the fuel of a
nuclear reactor are managed as high-level waste according to 10 CFR §§ 60 and 63. The
remaining wastes from reactor sites are designated as low-level waste, classed as Class A,
B, or C, and disposed according to 10 CFR § 61. Cyclotrons are particle accelerators;
thus, they need not be classed or disposed as radioactive waste according to the
definitions of “waste” and “byproduct material” from 10 CFR § 20.
Notwithstanding such exemptions, the data show that cyclotron decommissioning
projects are usually impacted by wastes exceeding the NRC criteria for unrestricted use,
and when such sites are remediated, waste exhibiting residual radioactivity is generated.
Where concrete is concerned, the long-lived radioactivity in waste is primarily due to
60

Co, 152Eu, and 154Eu, but we can infer due to a well-understood concept of physics that

other materials will also be radioactive according to an intrinsic characteristic called
neutron cross section. The field of physics also tells us that items nearest the neutron flux
(i.e., the cyclotron and its targets) are subject to more induced radioactivity than the rest
of the site due to the manner in which neutrons are attenuated.
As demonstrated by Table 6 and the accompanying narrative, cyclotron
decommissioning projects generate substantial quantities of waste, and the decisionmaking leading to present regulations appears to have missed such impacts. The facilities
at which cyclotrons are used do not operate indefinitely, and eventually, all 350 cyclotrons
presumed to be operating by IAEA in 2006 and any new sites will require disposal.
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According to a summary of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) that NRC publishes on its website on a page dedicated to its governing
legislation, every proposal for a major U.S. federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment requires a detailed statement on the environmental
impact of the proposed action and alternatives (NRC 2018i). NEPA predates the Energy
Reorganization Act (1974), the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act
(1985) and 10 CFR § 20 (1991); nonetheless, rulemaking that exempts cyclotron wastes
appears to have circumvented the environmental impact investigation process.
Limitations
This article expands upon previous research in that it examines radiological
characterization data from 11 cyclotron sites. These data are valuable for demonstrating
the site characteristics encountered by Ameriphysics during execution of its projects, but
they should not be used to generalize across all cyclotrons. These data are important, but
only represent seven out of the dozens of cyclotron makes and models. Moreover, the
experience of a different decommissioning firm could lead to different conclusions. For
example, a firm experienced primarily with the GE MINItrace (Site 1) might not
conclude that cyclotron sites present a significant hazard, whereas a firm involved only
with projects like Sites 3, 4, or 5 may recognize a grave concern.
A site operating one of the cyclotrons for which data is presented should not use
the data to predict a source term for their facility. A number of factors besides make and
model must be considered when estimating the amount of residual radioactivity
impacting a site, including but not limited to site layout, operating history, target
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configuration, and time since shutdown. Well planned, site-specific characterization
remains the best way to determine the nature and extent of induced radioactivity.
The dose calculated by RESRAD-BUILD is only as good as the inputs, and the
inputs in this case were limited. A single sample from each site is used to model a
concrete volume of 5.4 m3, and it is possible that this over or underrepresents the actual
hazard. The intent of using RESRAD-BUILD to determine dose equivalent is merely to
predict dose potential for comparisons against cleanup criterion, not to attribute an
absolute dose to each site.
Similarly, risk projections based on the dose model are only as good as the BEIR
VII inferences. In all instances, the modeled concrete volume returns doses less than 100
mSv, and as already mentioned elsewhere, it is careless to multiply the risk speculated at
low doses by large populations in order to make sensational claims concerning effects. As
an example of how the data should not be used, multiplying the incidence forecasted for
Site 3 (432 cases per 100,000 persons) by an approximated population of the U.S. (325
million) returns a result of more than 1.4 million excess cancers. The data are not
valuable in this manner, and the incidence is calculated and reported only as a means of
examining which sites could reasonably be assumed to demonstrate some risk. That is,
the risk associated with Site 1 is one in 1 million, and had all sites exhibited a
commensurate level of risk, a discussion of waste policy may have been moot.
Conclusion
As demonstrated in Table 6 and the accompanying narrative, cyclotron
decommissioning projects have the potential generate substantial quantities of waste
exceeding NRC’s dose limits for unrestricted use, and the decision-making leading to
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present regulations appears to have missed such impacts. The facilities at which
cyclotrons are used do not operate indefinitely, and eventually, all 350 or more cyclotrons
presumed to be operating in 2006 will require disposal. Several sites have already been
decommissioned as indicated by the projects contributing data to this study.
The NRC definition of waste specifically excludes materials produced by particle
accelerators; thus, cyclotron wastes are not regulated as low-level waste. If the exemption
was removed, such wastes would be classed as Class A and would require disposal at a
licensed facility according to 10 CFR § 61. Admittedly, Class A presents the lowest
hazard of any of the wastes NRC regulates. Nonetheless, an important conclusion is
possible based on this premise: low-level waste policymaking is not accomplished strictly
according to risk.
The disparity represented by this policy approach is due to the fact that wastes
conveying the same level of induced-cancer risk as materials defined as low-level
radioactive waste may be disposed differently or not at all. In turn, populations benefiting
from regulated disposal will have their doses controlled whereas populations impacted by
unregulated disposals or releases will not. Since radiation-induced cancers are related to
dose, not the words bureaucrats use to populate the glossaries that introduce their
rulemaking, important risk tradeoffs may be occurring.
Finally, this research is not a call for more or less regulation; rather, it seeks
parity. Cyclotron wastes either do or do not present a hazard based upon the radiation
dose potential and corresponding risk of cancer incidence demonstrated by this research.
If Class A reactor wastes are presumed to present a hazard significant enough to manage,
then so should cyclotron wastes presenting commensurate risk(s). On the other hand, if
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cyclotron waste is decided to be innocuous enough that strict management is not needed,
then regulations causing such management of Class A waste from reactors and other
nuclear sites should be revisited to verify that they are benefiting the public.
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CONCLUSION
Concise Review of Findings
This research is concerned with the risk basis for U.S. radiation policymaking;
specifically, that such policymaking is not conducted according to a framework that
adequately considers risk tradeoff. Three questions and corresponding studies were
proposed and accomplished.
Question 1: Is RTA a suitable means of exploring U.S. radiation policymaking
decisions? The literature review returned 64 documents that were concerned with risk
tradeoff in some manner, but only 8 documents were concerned with radiation risks.
None of the radiation-related documents specifically relied on the RTA framework. Six
express a need for forward-thinking policymaking that considers countervailing risks,
however, and RTA provides a logical framework that has benefited other public-health
related decision making.
Question 2: How is radiation policymaking leading to risk tradeoffs
conceptualized with a health-behavior based model? Graham and Weiner propose five
prevailing sources of risk tradeoff, and evidence was found linking radiation
policymaking to all five. Similarly, policymaking seems impacted by each of the
compensating behaviors described by Bandura’s moral disengagement theory. A
conceptual model predicts that well-intentioned policymakers, informed by the radiation
paradigm and facing pervasive sources of risk tradeoff, will offer policy solutions that
reduce target risks within the policymaker’s jurisdiction but ignore the countervailing
risks that are presented outside of that person’s jurisdiction. The net result is policies that
fail to offer maximum risk protection, and optimal health outcomes are not achieved.
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Question 3: Do wastes from cyclotron decommissioning projects pose health
disparities that U.S. nuclear waste policies currently ignore? Calculated dose equivalents
from the 11 sites examined ranged from 0.01 to 43.2 mSv y-1 and correspond to a risk of
0.1 to 432 extra cases of solid cancer or leukemia per 100,000 persons. Waste from nine
of the sites exceeds the NRC’s criteria for unrestricted use, 0.25 mSv y-1. When these
sites are remediated, the resulting waste is not regulated as low-level radioactive waste
according to U.S. policy, but would have been if generated at a site other than a cyclotron
facility. A case for disparity is identified because populations benefiting from regulated
disposal will have their doses controlled whereas populations impacted by unregulated
disposals or releases will not.
Limitations
Each of the studies was impacted by a unique set of limitations. As those articlespecific limitations are sufficiently examined in the discussion sections of respective
chapters, there is no value in restating them here.
A key limitation of the overall research effort reflected by the compiled works is
that this is exploratory work at best. As demonstrated by the systematic review, this
research did not identify a single study wherein the formal framework suggested by
Graham and Wiener was used to analyze risk tradeoffs when radiation was a concern.
Moreover, none of the articles presented herein convey a formal analysis according to
such a framework. Nonetheless, an exploratory analysis was the goal, and this research is
considered important because it shows (1) risk tradeoffs are likely occurring, (2) an
evidence-based framework exists to assess such tradeoffs, and (3) radiation researchers
and policymakers are not currently relying on this framework.
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Another limitation is that in making a case for a new paradigm for policymaking,
this research does not present any new finding that are valuable for determining which
model of dose-response best predicts the association between radiation dose and adverse
health effects. This limitation is by design, as the controversy surrounding such models is
expected to continue for some time. What this research demonstrates is the manner in
which policymaking can be improved by examining the circumstances leading to risk
tradeoffs, regardless of which model of dose-response prevails.
Recommendations for Future Research
The fundamental recommendation of this work is that in order for a new
policymaking paradigm to be made, analyses that specifically examine the countervailing
risks posed by dose-limiting regulations are needed. Such examinations should weigh the
benefits of radiation dose risk reductions against costs due to countervailing risk
according to (1) magnitude of risk, (2) size of population impacted, (3) certainty of risk
estimates, (4) type of adverse outcome, (5) distribution, and (6) timing (Graham and
Wiener 1995). Where possible, the comparisons should be quantitative, but qualitative
studies would suffice where meaningful qualitative measures do not exist or are being
developed.
The NRC’s rules, in particular its Standards for Protection Against Radiation,
seem complicated by sources of risk tradeoff and likely to benefit from an examination
with RTA. The NRC is an institution of specialists charged with reducing specific risks.
Moreover, due to jurisdictional boundaries, other agencies are responsible for risks
outside of NRC’s purview, including countervailing risks caused by NRC’s rules. These
issues demonstrate complexities due to bounding roles, and is exemplified by EPA’s
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responsibility to protect human health and the environment from hazards beyond
radiation (EPA 2000, EPA/NRC 2002) and OSHA’s responsibility to assure safe and
healthful working conditions in the presence of all hazards (NRC/OSHA 2013, DOL
2018b). Evidence of omitted voice is provided by NRC’s reliance on BEIR VII for risk
estimates. That report is informed primarily by research from the Radiation Effects
Research Foundation on atomic bomb survivorship, and some critics claim that the voices
representing other research are dismissed too easily (Fabrikant 1981, Goldman 1996,
GAO 2000, Calabrese 2007, Luckey 2008, Aleta 2009, Tubiana et al. 2009, Vaiserman
2010, Suzuki and Yamashita 2012, Calabrese 2013, Doss 2013). Old-technology bias is
exemplified by a reluctance to deviate from the LNT model and other conservative
measures reflecting the status quo (GAO 2000, Calabrese 2013). Heuristic processes
align with the assumption that all radiation is harmful and should be avoided (Walker
2000), and cancer, DNA lesions, and other mutagenesis are likely to rank higher than
other risks, particularly in terms of public perception. Regulations enforce compensating
behaviors via the NRC’s policy of maintaining exposures as low as reasonably achievable
(ALARA), which over time has resulted in acceptance of actions that pile conservatisms
on top of other conservatisms (GAO 2000, Walker 2000, Jones 2005). Aside from these
blatant examples of risk tradeoff sources, the NRC has formally demonstrated a desire to
practice risk-based policymaking according to a 1995 final policy statement on the matter
(NRC 1995). NRC’s radiation-risk-mitigating limits predate its acceptance of this policy,
however, and were developed with deterministic methods (NRC 2007). Finally, the NRC
is under some pressure to reduce its dose limits in a manner conforming to
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recommendations from the International Commission on Radiological Protection, and
many consider the existing rules to provide sufficient protection (Cool 2012).
A disparity reflected by the NRC’s dose-based cleanup criteria, 0.25 mSv y-1, is
that workers accomplishing cleanup are subject to 200 times the radiation-induced solidcancer risk of a theoretical critical group representing the general population based on
estimates from BEIR VII and the rules regulating their exposures. Moreover, cleanup
workers are exposed to a large number of non-radiological industrial health and safety
hazards. Heavy equipment operation, the use of power tools and torches, demolition,
earthmoving, transportation, lifting and rigging, and the handling of hazardous chemicals
and cleaners are examples of health and safety challenges (i.e., tradeoffs) that are
encountered while cleaning up small amounts of radioactive contamination.
The environmental burden caused by cleanup is also considerable. Since as early
as 1978, EPA has recognized that ecological impacts are caused by land restoration and
cleanup (EPA 1978). Natural ecosystems, managed ecosystems, and wildlife may be
negatively affected by cleanup efforts (EPA 1978, Burger et al. 2007). In some cases, the
effects may be irreversible, as in the destruction of habitats and slow-growing lifeforms
such as lichens (EPA 1978). Ecological environments are slow to recover, and resolving
the effects of cleanup is not as easy as backfilling or revegetating. Cleanup work is
accomplished with equipment that burns fossil fuel, and it is not unusual for a large
cleanup project to burn tens of thousands of gallons of diesel fuel. Similarly, innocuous
levels of radioactive waste are transported across the country by diesel-burning
conveyances. Moreover, a large commitment of land is required to bury and manage
these wastes. Where soil remediation occurs, backfill and topsoil must be stripped from
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another location to restore the remediated site, and such resources are not easily renewed.
In addition to leaving the donor site barren, the removal and transportation processes also
require the use of diesel-burning heavy equipment and trucks.
As these examples demonstrate, a number of countervailing risks are introduced
by the NRC’s cleanup criterion that, according to BEIR VII estimates, corresponds to
approximately two solid cancers developing (not deaths) per 100,000 people. If the LNT
model is incorrect, if a threshold exists, or if hormesis is a legitimate factor, the
countervailing risks are experienced without any corresponding reduction in population
risk. Moreover, cleanup criteria do not correlate to exposures shared by a large
population; rather, they correspond to the peak dose to a theoretical, average member of a
small “critical group” who, at some point over the next 1,000 years, builds and lives in a
house on the contaminated land (NRC 2006). During that time, this hypothetical
individual is expected to drink from a contaminated well, breathe contaminated air, and
grow vegetables and raise animals on contaminated farmland that serve as his (a
reference man is modeled) primary source of food (NRC 2006). This conservative,
bounding theoretical scenario is called “resident farmer” (NRC 2006). Thus, the dose this
limit represents is an intangible dose; in fact, a radiation detector has not been invented
that measures resident-farmer dose. Rather, the dose limit is translated with computer
models into surface or mass concentrations against which comparisons can be made with
field and laboratory equipment (NRC 2006). There is considerable uncertainty associated
with such models (NRC 2006), and according to the behavioral norms discussed
elsewhere, it is common to pile conservatism on top of conservatism in an attempt to
reconcile uncertainty and keep exposures ALARA. Finally, international
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recommendations include cleanup criterion as low as 0.01 mSv (IAEA 2006b), which
would further exacerbate possible tradeoffs. EPA, some Agreement States, and France,
German, Spain, and the United Kingdom already have lower cleanup limits than the NRC
(EPA 1997, Meck 2012, Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2016, State of New Jersey
n.d.).
Data pertaining to countervailing occupational health outcomes are available from
a variety of sources. Nationally, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor
Statistics collects and publishes data on mortality according to its Census of Fatal
Occupational Injuries (CFOI) and on morbidity according to its Survey of Occupational
Injuries and Illness (SOII). Data pertaining to occupational outcomes are also available
from national surveillances not specific to occupational health. Such secondary sources
include the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and the National Health and
Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES). At least 15 states have received funding from
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to accomplish
surveillances activities within their borders (Souza et al. 2010). State surveillances
provide important information on local occupational health differences and intervention
activities (Souza et al. 2010). Moreover, state surveys sometimes provide superior data in
terms of occupational illness and particularly in the case of chronic illness (Souza et al.
2010). It is not possible to discriminate radiation workers from other workers; however,
and important differences may exist between these groups. For example, worker health
and safety risk estimates are possible for construction workers, but radiological
construction workers may participate in more robust health and safety programs than the
average construction worker.
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Risks pertaining to airborne pollutants, such as the emissions released from the
burning of fossil fuels, have been quantified by other researchers and associate ambient
airborne pollution exposures to mortality from all-causes, cardiovascular disease, and
respiratory disease (Pope et al. 1995, Pope et al. 2002, Pope et al. 2004, Hoek et al.
2013). Specifically, Kloog et al. examines the short-term and long-term effects of PM2.5
exposures on population mortality (Kloog et al. 2013), and Pope and Dockery have
published a meta-analyses connecting fine particulate air pollution and adverse health
effects (Pope and Dockery 2006).
Characterizing ecological risks with quantitative measures for comparison
purposes is more difficult. Traditionally, the bioindicators researchers rely on relate to
either ecological health or human health (Burger and Gochfeld 2001). Arguably, human
health assessment is the easier of the two. Ecosystems cannot speak for themselves and
are unable to respond to surveillances in the same manner as humans. Moreover, humans
are a single species and experience a relatively limited range of health endpoints, whereas
ecological health assessment must consider many species, endpoints, and higher order
interactions (Burger and Gochfeld 2001). Since as early as 1978, EPA has recognized
that ecological impacts are caused by land restoration and cleanup (EPA 1978). Natural
ecosystems, managed ecosystems, and wildlife may be negatively affected by cleanup
efforts (EPA 1978, Burger et al. 2007). In some cases, the effects may be irreversible, as
in the destruction of habitats and slow-growing lifeforms such as lichens (EPA 1978).
Ecological environments are slow to recover, and resolving the effects of cleanup is not
as easy as backfilling or revegetating.
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The NRC’s low-level waste management policymaking may also be conflicted in
a manner that causes risk tradeoffs. The NRC does not regulate waste disposal according
to dose. Instead, waste is defined in the NRC’s regulations with complex language and
wastes meeting the definition are regulated. The disparities represented by this approach
are due to the fact that wastes conveying the same level of induced-cancer risk may be
disposed differently or not at all. In turn, populations benefiting from regulated disposal
will have their exposures controlled whereas populations interfacing with unregulated
disposals or releases will not. Since radiation-induced cancers are related to effective
dose, not the words bureaucrats use to populate glossaries, risk tradeoffs may be
occurring.
Evidence Supporting a Paradigm Shift
The research contributing to this paper identified certain concise evidence that
supports the need for a radiation policymaking paradigm that considers risk tradeoffs.
1) In 1978, EPA’s Office of Radiation Programs published a Technical Report
entitled The Ecological Impact of Land Restoration and Cleanup recognizing
the short and long term consequences (i.e., tradeoffs) associated with the
Agency’s policies. The report was written “primarily from the viewpoint of
radiation protection” according to the Deputy Assistant Administrator for
EPA’s Radiation Programs at the time (EPA 1978). It is valuable to note that
this report was published fewer than eight years after the EPA was created and
just three years after the NRC began its operations. From this evidence, we
can conclude that radiation policymaking has been known to be associated
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with risk tradeoffs since before either agency was considered a mature
organization.
2) Since at least 1985, just 10 years after opening its doors, NRC has understood
that prescriptive policymaking interferes with the commission’s ability to
make risk-superior decisions (NRC 1985). This evidence comes from NRC’s
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and is published in its policy on future
reactor designs, NUREG-1070. The document contains a call for development
of “forward-looking policy” that explores “safety-cost tradeoffs within the
framework of permissible risk-risk tradeoffs” (NRC 1985).
3) In 2002, a DOE top-to-bottom review team concluded that since establishing
its Office of Environmental Management in 1989, the Agency had spent more
than $60 billion on cleanup without realizing a reduction in actual health risk
because of the number of ecological, temporal, and human health tradeoffs
involved (Burger et al. 2004). A follow-on study examining 36 sites in 17
states with an environmental management mission concluded that DOE
needed a decision making tool capable of balancing a number of different
ecological and health risks (Burger et al. 2004).
4) According to a 2016 article concerning the disaster Fukushima Daiichi and
related mortality, nearly 2,000 deaths can be attributed to policymaking
accomplished according to the paradigm that any amount of radiation is
harmful and should be avoided. The article was published in the Annals of the
International Commission on Radiological Protection and concludes that the
number of people killed as a consequence of evacuating the prefecture to
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avoid low-dose radiation exceeded the number of Fukushima inhabitants who
were killed directly by the earthquake and tsunami (Hayakawa 2016).
A key takeaway from these findings is that the top federal agencies concerned
with radiation protection have understood, almost since their inception, that risk tradeoff
is a pervasive feature of their policymaking. Nonetheless, these agencies continue to base
their rules and regulations on a policymaking paradigm that reduces dose but not
necessarily risk. As demonstrated by observations from Fukushima Daiichi, adverse
health outcomes are possible when the countervailing risks associated with dose-limiting
policymaking are ignored.
Education Needs
Finally, this paper would be negligent if it failed to emphasize a need for
education. A new policymaking paradigm will not be realized unless (1) the public is
educated on the genuine risk presented by exposure to low levels of environmental
radiation and (2) radiation protection professionals and practitioners are better trained to
communicate such risk to the public.
It is a fact that the risks associated with low doses of radiation are very small or
nonexistent; a claim that is substantiated by the risk estimates and narrative provided by
BEIR VII (2006). In the end, we find that environmental radiation is not a very effective
carcinogen. While adverse non-cancer health effects are also possible, what the public
typically recognizes as “radiation sickness”, such outcomes require very large exposures
– far above the levels with which dose-limiting policymaking is concerned. Finally,
radiation exposure is not associated with the perverse somatic and genetic effects
sensationalized by Hollywood. While dose-limiting policymaking is concerned with
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preventing damage leading to DNA mutations, these mutations are “broadly similar to the
types that occur naturally” such as changes leading to oncogenesis (NAS 2006).
Radiation exposure does not endow anyone with any special powers or abilities or cause
tails or other extra appendages to spontaneously sprout.
Public sentiment does not align with the statements of fact comprising the
previous paragraph (Jordan 2016). In part, this is because the media and other social
experiences are working harder and faster than the science programs in our primary and
secondary schools. Thus, educational programs necessarily involve an element of unteaching previously conceived attitudes and beliefs where radiation is concerned. But
some blame is due to the radiation protection professionals who are responsible for
educating and communicating risk to the public. In a 2018 article published in Radiation
Protection Dosimetry, a case is made for essential characteristics of risk communication.
These characteristics include use of techniques such as understanding how to frame
information given a person’s values, building trust, and fully considering how
information is provided (Murakami et al. 2018). We cannot expect practitioners to
understand the dual nature of risk communication - as professionals and humans – unless
they are trained and educated accordingly.
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